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ABSTRACT 
PREVENTION OF OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE 
OF TUBERCULOSIS 
TO HEALTH CARE WORKERS 	  
by 
Thomas C. Carle 
The resurgence of tuberculosis in the United States within the past decade 
has prompted the health care community to develop tuberculosis elimination 
policies. However, recent outbreaks of tuberculosis have proved to be resistant 
to multiple antibiotics. Tuberculosis infections among health care workers is 
also rising. This increase in occupational exposures has prompted the 
examination of current exposure control measures. 
The occupational exposure to tuberculosis is prevented by the use of 
administrative policies, engineering controls and personal protective equipment. 
Each control measure has inherent strengths and weaknesses and when 
implemented through an exposure control plan the risk of occupational exposure 
can be reduced. Control techniques currently utilized may benefit from 
additional research and development. The research will not be squandered if 
tuberculosis is ultimately eliminated, as the knowledge gained may prove 
beneficial for exposure protection from future bio-hazardous aerosols. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE TUBERCULOSIS BACILLI 
1.1 Introduction 
Tuberculosis has been acknowledged as a major health threat throughout the 
history of mankind. Despite the decline of new cases experienced during the 
middle of this century, it has again become a serious threat in the United States. 
Once again research and technology have been applied towards the prevention 
and cure of tuberculosis. Tuberculosis is caused by a bacteria called the 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis also known as tubercle bacillus (TB) which is 
coined from the Latin word tubercle, meaning small lump or nodule. The lungs 
are the predominate site of the infection; however, any body tissue is 
susceptible. When a significant infection develops in the lung, necrosis may 
occur, often the size of a nut or small egg, that heals either by fibrosis, 
encapsulation, calcification or scar formation. When these lesions soften and 
break down through liquidfication, the characteristic cavity within the lung 
associated with TB remains. Despite the constant decline of new cases since 
1953, TB has realized a resurgence in the U.S. beginning in 1985. To discuss 
the implications and the contributing factors of this increase and its impact on 
the health care community, it is necessary to first understand the history, 
etiology, epidemiology and pathogenesis of TB. 
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1.2 History 
TB ravaged skeletons from pre-historic times have been discovered and pre-
biblical references made of a human illness similar to TB in the pre-2000 BC 
Code of Hummurabi, demonstrating that TB has had a long history with 
mankind. This scourge was known as "phthisis" by the Greeks, "consumption" 
in the Bible, the "great white plague" in the Victorian era, and finally, as 
"tuberculosis" beginning with the age of modern medicine. Hippocrates (460-377 
BC) considered TB to be the gravest of all the diseases at that time, the most 
difficult to cure and the most fatal (1). That sentiment followed for hundreds 
of years as physicians were discouraged from treating advanced cases of TB 
since the patient would surely die and damage their reputation, that is until the 
age of modern medicine. 
The modern discoveries initiated by Rene Théophile Laënnec who invented 
the stethoscope in 1816 and L. Auenbrugger who re-developed chest percussion 
from the ancient Greek technique in the late 1700's, allowed clinical diagnosis 
and the physical signs and morbid anatomy of TB to be defined. Also proposed 
was evidence that this single disease which originated in the lung could have a 
systemic effect on other body tissues. Laënnec never believed that TB was 
contagious or transmissible. However, he ironically infected himself when sawing 
a cadaver skeleton during an autopsy in what was described as one of the first 
documented accounts of transference of TB (2). In 1868, Jean-Antoine Villemin 
proposed that TB was an inoculable agent or germ and was transferable from 
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man or cow and that TB never originates spontaneously and is perpetuated only 
by transmission through society (3). In 1882, Robert Koch isolated the tubercle 
bacillus by use of a staining process. Koch's discovery finally ended the 
assumptions made for thousands of years that the disease was hereditary and 
attributed to "bad blood" or "bad hereditary" (4). The invention of the 
microscope, allowed a detailed examination of sputum cultures with staining 
techniques. The discovery of X-rays in 1885 by Roentgen revealed the presence 
of cavity formations in the lung enabling an accurate diagnosis to be made. 
Typically, those who were identified as being infected with TB often convalesced 
at sanatoria where bed rest, good food and moderate exercise along with surgery 
in the more severe cases served as the only relief of the disease's symptoms. 
Surgical techniques relieved suffering and put diseased portions of the lung at 
rest and collapsing the lung by artificial pneumothorax or removal of portions 
of the lung resection or lobectomy. Finally, with the development of 
streptomycin by Selman A. Waksman, the first chemotherapy was made 
available for the treatment of TB. 
In 1945, the first attempts at chemotherapy with Waksman's streptomycin 
were made. Streptomycin is an antibacterial antibiotic which was combined later 
with another antibiotic called para-aminosalicylic acid (PAS). This combination 
of drugs delayed the emergence of streptomycin resistant strains of TB. With 
the introduction of isoniazid (INH), another antibiotic in 1952, three drugs were 
now available for the treatment of TB. PAS and INH were given orally, 
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typically for a course of 18 to 24 months. In 1962, PAS was replaced by 
Ethambutol which had fewer adverse side effects. Chemotherapy was extremely 
effective and had practically forced the closing of the sanitoriums in the US by 
1960. In 1966, rifampin (RIF) was added to the chemotherapy regimen which 
allowed the treatment period to be nearly cut in half. 
1.3 Etiology 
The ground work for the modern etiology of TB was proposed by Robert Koch 
in his paper The Etiology of Tuberculosis (5) that was presented before the 
Physiological Society of Berlin on March 24, 1881 leaving the audience in utter 
silence as he struck down the beliefs of many of his opponents in attendance. 
Koch understood from Villemin's and the research of others that TB was 
transmissible and that some nature of a parasite or bacteria was responsible for 
its transmission. 	 Koch systematically analyzed suspected tuberculosis 
microorganisms and, through the development of a specific staining process, was 
able to isolate the Mycobacterium tuberculosis. Koch was able to subsequently 
grow the bacteria in an artificial medium and inoculate laboratory animals which 
resulted in TB infections. There was nothing extraordinary with regards to his 
methodology; however, he received much world acclaim for being the first to 
isolate the previously unseen "greatest killer of mankind". 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis is an obligate intracellular parasite or nonmotile 
rod as shown in Figure 1. TB shares a particular staining quality with other acid 
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fast aerobic bacilli (AFB). After staining with a carbol-fuchsin compound and 
then washing with nitric acid, the cell walls that contain lipids absorb the stains 
and form a stable complex with the cells allowing the identification of the 
organism by turning the AFB red and all other tissue blue. 
Figure 1 The Mycobacterium tuberculosis (X 90,000 by electron microscope) 
Various strains of TB have occurred and taxonomists disagree as to whether 
to divide the genus Mycobacterium tuberculosis into three complexes: M. 
tuberculosis, M. bovis and M. africanum where others would consider M. 
tuberculosis to be the only complex with subclassifications for the M. bovine or 
M. african type. 
1.4 Epidemiology 
As indicated in his 1865 paper, On the Cause and Nature of Tuberculosis and Its 
Inoculation From Man to Rabbit, (6) Villemin demonstrated that TB could be 
transferred among animals with the injection of sputum or blood from 
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infections, utilizing control experiments. He further concluded that TB was a 
specific virus (although TB is actually a bacterium) which did not occur 
spontaneously and was not the product of emaciation, misery, atmospheric 
disturbances, heredity, occupations nor progressive maladies (6). Three years 
later in his book Etudes sur la Tuberculosis, (3) Villemin further proposed that 
TB was more prevalent among medical personnel, soldiers stationed in barracks 
than among troops in the field, prisoners, industrial workers and members of 
cloistered religious orders. Villemin found that TB was less prevalent at higher 
altitudes and among those groups that live in the open air in a nomadic state, 
and more prevalent in cities and among groups that are confined indoors (3). 
His recommendations for combating TB included the improvement of working 
conditions, ventilation and the disinfection of things and places occupied by 
consumptive patients. 
Today, it's understood that TB is transmitted via airborne aerosols 1-5 
microns in diameter which are generated by persons infected with pulmonary or 
laryngeal TB where active bacteria are expelled when they cough, sneeze, speak 
or sing (8). The aerosolized particles may be suspended in air or travel on 
ambient air currents for long periods. Those infected in extrapulmonary sites are 
not contagious via the airborne route, however, care must be utilized when 
handling infected human tissue. TB thrives in dark, moist places and dies on 
exposure to sunlight and drying (9). Linens, eating utensils and bed clothes are 
not considered viable routes of infection. Other less frequent routes of exposure 
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include injection through the skin by laboratory workers who may be cut by glass 
containing actively growing TB cultures, surgeons and nurses in operating 
theaters who aerolize TB infected tissue during surgery and pathologists 
conducting postmortems on TB infected corpses. In the days of unpasteurized 
milk M. bovis was transmitted causing TB of the tonsils and submandibular 
lymph nodes of humans. 
Other contributing factors in susceptibility to TB include concentration of 
aerosol droplet nuclei in the air and length of exposure. Once infected, only 5% 
to 10% of persons not HIV+ will show clinical signs of the disease in their 
lifetime (10). Pulmonary sites account for 85% of cases of TB while 
extrapulmonary sites such as blood, central nervous system, pleura, pericardium, 
genitourinary, gastrointestinal tract, adrenal, liver, mouth, middle ear, larynx, 
bronchial tree, lymph, bones and joints represent the remaining 15%. 
The Center for Disease Control (CDC) has recently classified the following 
groups as high risk for developing TB. This group includes persons who are 
HIV+ or who are suspected of being HIV+; those in close contact with newly 
diagnosed infectious TB patients; recent converters of TB skin tests; persons 
with chest X-rays indicative of old healed TB; intravenous drug users or persons 
with other medical conditions known to be susceptible to TB. Other risk factors 
identified include foreign-born persons from high prevalence countries, 
medically underserved low-income populations and residents of long term care 
facilities (11). 	 Other investigators believe that health care workers also 
facing 8 
Table 1 Reported Cases and Rates of Tuberculosis in the United States 
CASES 
% 
RATE per 100,000 persons 
1985 1990 1985 1990 % 
Totals 22,201 25,701 +15.8 9.3 10.3 +10.8 
Sex 
males 14,496 16,966 +17.0 12.5 14.0 +12.0 
female 7,704 8,729 +13.3 6.3 6.8 +7.9 
unknown 1 6 - -  
Age 
0-4 789 936 +18.6 4.4 5.1 +15.9 
5-14 472 660 +39.8 1.4 1.9 +35.7 
15-24 1,672 1,867 +11.7 4.2 5.1 +21.4 
25-44 6,758 9,730 +44.0 9.2 12.0 +30.4 
45-64 6,138 6,365 +3.7 13.7 13.7 0.0 
>64 6,356 6,115 -3.8 22.3 19.6 -12.1 
unknown 16 28 - NA NA - 
Race/Ethnicity 
White 8,453 7,836 -7.3 4.5 4.2 -6.7 
Black 7,592 9,634 +26.9 27.1 33.0 +21.8 
Hispanic 3,092 4,782 +54.7 17.3 21.4 +23.7 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander 2,530 3,027 +19.6 46.0 41.6 -9.6 
Native Alaskan/ 
American 397 371 -6.5 24.9 18.9 -24.1 
Other 137 51 - NA NA - 
Country of Origin 
Foreign 4,925 6,626 +27.1 NA NA 
US-born 17,712 18,997 +7.3 NA NA 
Unknown 131 442 - NA NA - 
Source: Center for Disease Control. 1990. "Tuberculosis Morbidity in the United 
States Final Data,1990" Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 40 SS-3. 
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represent a high risk group. The CDC recognizes the potential for the spread 
of TB among health care workers and patients alike within health care facilities 
and has prepared recommendations outlining a set of guidelines for the 
prevention of contamination. 
The latest published data by the CDC from 1990, shown in Table 1, 
indicates the greatest rise in new cases of TB to be among the age group 
between 25 to 44 with a 44% increase over the 1985 data. The rise in new cases 
of 39.8% among the 5 to 1.4 year old's is attributed to the fact that most often, 
an older family member in the 25 to 44 age group has contracted the illness and 
transfers the TB bacteria by virtue of living in the same household (12). The 
only declines among new cases were found in members of the groups belonging 
to the white non-hispanic and Native American or Alaskan groups. Increases 
in new TB cases also have been shown to parallel those of new cases within the 
HIV epidemic mainly occurring in males within the 25 to 44 year old age group. 
1.5 Pathology 
In the primary phase of TB, assuming the bacteria are airborne and able to pass 
through the upper airways defenses of the mucosal membranes or cilia, the 1-2 
micron diameter organisms will lodge in the alveoli of the lungs, usually in the 
lower or mid lung fields, while those larger than 3-5 microns in size deposit 
higher in the respiratory tract. Once trapped, the bacteria multiply and spread 
through the lymph system and blood stream, quickly infecting other organs, 
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typically those high in oxygen concentration. Inflammation occurs at the site of 
initial deposition in the lung forming granulomas consisting of epithelioid cells, 
macrophages and giant cells. As the infected person's immune system becomes 
sensitized and recognizes the bacteria, macrophages attack, not destroying, but 
engulfing and surrounding the TB organism and walling them off in tiny hard 
capsules called tubercles throughout the body (13). Depending on the 
concentration, virulence of the bacteria and effectiveness of the immune system, 
these granulomas in the lung (if they are large enough) may cause a form of 
necrosis called caseation, which has the consistency of soft cheese (14). The 
caseaum softens and liquifies when attacked by the toxin emitting cytotoxic 
lymphocyte macrophage of the immune system. A cavity will form in the lung 
when this liquid material and lung tissue is expelled. In less serious infections, 
the initial site may heal completely without any cavitation. The secondary stage 
consists of the healing process of the primary infection which includes the 
formation of cavities and scar tissue in the lung. 
During the third stage, the bacilli remain encapsulated by the macrophage. 
They may remain encapsulated for the lifetime of the patient, and may never 
cause a reactivation of the disease. However, should the immune system 
become depressed and the macrophages weaken, a fourth stage will occur when 
the bacteria reactivate and multiply. This process occurs in a relatively small 
population of normally healthy persons not infected with an immunosuppressant 
illness like HIV. This multiplication often will occur in the lung usually at the 
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apex, or at other extrapulmonary sites. A fifth stage occurs if a previously 
infected person becomes again infected with a variant bacilli of drug sensitivity 
different from that of the primary infection. 
1.6 Signs and Symptoms 
The early medical community unknowingly often placed TB within a general 
class of illness with similar characteristics. The early Greeks utilized the word 
phthisis meaning "wasting of the body" to describe the fluid losses of the body 
from diarrhea in the latter stages of the illness, and from drenching sweats (4). 
Later, consumption was used to describe the burning up or wasting of the body. 
Finally, tuberculosis was used to describe the illness from the Latin word 
tuberculum, meaning lump. 
One of the earliest and most encompassing descriptions of the disease was 
by the early Roman physician Caelius Aurelianus who stated: 
The symptoms of the disease are as follows: there is a latent fever, 
which generally begins toward the end of the day and is relieved by 
the coming of the new day; this is accompanied by much coughing at 
the beginning and end of the night, with discharge of sanious sputa... 
The voice is either hoarse or high pitched, breathing difficult, cheeks 
flushed, and the rest of the body ashen colored. The eyes have a 
worn appearance, and the patient is emaciated, a fact more obvious 
from the appearance of the naked body. In some cases there is a 
hissing sound or wheezing in the chest; and, as the disease spreads, 
there is sweating in the upper parts down to the end of the chest.(15) 
Pulmonary tuberculosis, as previously indicated, is asymptomatic at first. 
The initial signs of fever, weakness and weight loss are very subtle and often 
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unnoticed. Signs become more apparent once the lesion in the lung is visible 
on X-ray. A cough occurs as secretions are drained from necrotic lung tissue 
into the bronchi. The cough is more productive usually in the morning from the 
accumulation of secretions overnight while sleeping. The expectorate or sputum 
produced from the cough is green and purulent and is minimal at first, 
increasing as cavitation occurs. As cavitation ends and the illness enters a more 
chronic stage, the expectorant becomes yellowish. Hemoptysis, or the coughing 
of blood, may occur as cavitation erodes an arterial wall, or inflammation of the 
endobronchial tree develops. Bleeding may range from slight streaking in the 
sputum to massive bleeding, but is rarely fatal. Chest wall pain may occur as 
the pleural lining of the lung may become inflamed by effusion of fluids. 
Dyspnea, or shortness of breath, may occur from spontaneous pneumothorax or 
pleural effusion (16). 
1.7 Diagnosis 
The tuberculin skin test is useful in determining if a patient is infected, however, 
a negative test should not exclude a diagnosis of TB (16). Several tests have 
been developed, all of which utilize a purified protein derivative (PPD) antigen 
which is introduced to challenge the immune system. The most effective 
method is an intradermal injection called Mantoux's Test. Other methods 
include a scratch method called Pirquet's Test or a multipuncture tine test. 
Typically five tuberculin units (TU) are administered, however, one TU may be 
12 
utilized for young children. A positive test results in a palpable induration or 
upwelling of the injection site over 10mm in 48 hours. 
As the skin test is not a definitive indicator if a patient is infected, the 
importance of taking a careful history and conducting a through physical 
examination by the physician cannot be mitigated. When suspicion of TB exists, 
the patient should be asked if contact has been made with known TB infected 
patients or members of high risk groups. Chest X-rays may be useful for 
showing cavitation; however, this may not always be diagnosed by the radiologist 
who may interpret the finding as another malady. Bacterial examination of 
sputum samples which test positive for staining AFB also will prove effective; 
however, other AFB's besides TB cannot be ruled out by this method. 
Definitive diagnosis can only be made with the cultural identification of the 
sputum samples. This process currently takes three to six weeks and entails the 
growing of the bacteria in a culture medium. One advantage to this technique 
is the capability of determining the varying degree of resistance to antibiotics 
utilized in combating TB should a new drug resistant strain be present. 
1.8 Summary 
Modern medicine prevailed during the middle of this century in the war against 
TB. Thousands of lives were saved as the result of the development of 
antibiotics. The advent of multidrug resistant TB strains has made the potential 
for cure more difficult. This has increased the importance of understanding the 
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pathology, epidemiology and etiology of TB in order to prevent its unnecessary 
transmission through society. The public health service must disseminate their 
knowledge to make the general public, and health care workers in particular, 
aware of the need for concern. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE NEED FOR CONCERN 
2.1 Introduction 
Once known to be the leading cause of death among young adults during the 
industrial revolution in both Europe and the United States, and once commonly 
called the "great white plague", the tuberculosis bacilli is again showing a 
resurgence in new cases in the US. These outbreaks have prompted the Public 
Health Service's, Advisory Committee for Elimination of Tuberculosis (ACET) 
to propose as a goal the elimination of TB in the US by year 2010. The 
diseases resurgence has been attributed to several factors: the increase in 
multidrug-resistant strains of TB, susceptibility of patients infected with HIV to 
TB, immigration of infected persons into the US, and the weakening of the 
healthcare infrastructure. Ironically, the health care system which is charged 
with the task of caring for the sick, may unknowingly bring patient's with active 
TB together with those with depressed immunosystems, such as, HIV. This new 
resurgence has made it essential for the health care community to examine its 
existing infrastructure to insure that additional exposures do not occur among 
health care workers and patients alike. A discussion of each causative factor 
and its implication related to the recent increase in outbreak of tuberculosis 
follows in this chapter. 
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2.2 Resurgence of Tuberculosis in the United States 
On the world wide level, particularly in third world countries, TB has continued 
at epidemic levels for decades despite the development of antibiotics. The 
World Health Organization estimates that 8 million new cases and 3 million 
deaths occur annually (17). Fortunately, these massive epidemic levels have not 
reached the US, but a resurgence nevertheless is occurring here. The total 
number of TB cases began declining in the US following the clinical 
introduction of streptomycin in 1947. As shown in Table 2, the death rate also 
decreased significantly with the introduction of antibiotics. 
Table 2 Tuberculosis Morbidity an Mortality in the United States 
YEAR NEW CASES TB DEATHS 
DEATH RATE 
per 100,000 
1930 124,940 88,010 71.0 
1947 134,946 48,064 33.0 
1950 121,742 33,959 22.0 
1953 106,925 19,393 12.0 
1959 11,429 6.5 
Source: Selman A. Waksman The Conquest of Tuberculosis. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: The University of California Press 1964, 23. 
The CDC began collecting TB data nation wide in a standardized 
manner in 1953. The data indicated that from 1953 and until 1985, the rate of 
new cases has declined steadily by 5% to 6% each year. However, from the 
period between 1985 to 1991 an 18% increase in new cases was reported. This 
represents 39,000 additional cases beyond those normally expected (10). Figure 
facing 16 
Table 3 HIV Mortality Data for 1990 
1990 CASES 
Totals 
Sex 
males 
female 
Age 
0-4 
5-12 
13-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
>60 
Race/Ethnicity  
43352 
38094 
5258 
626 
162 
170 
8334 
19728 
10023 
3020 
1289 
White 22326 
Black 13211. 
Hispanic 7353 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander 271 
Native Alaskan/ 
American 79 
Source:Center for Disease Control. 1992. "Update, Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome United States 1991 " Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 
41: No 26. 
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2 shows the graph of the increase over the projected decline. 
Figure 2 Graph of Expected Cases of TB vs Actual Cases 
Source: Snider, Dixie E. and Dooley, Samuel W. 1993. Nosocomial Tuberculosis 
in the AIDS Era With a Emphasis on Multidrug Resistant Disease." 
Heart and Lung. 22:366. 
With the recent upward trend in new cases, the CDC realized that the war 
against TB was not over. Greater emphasis was now placed on the 
identification of the predisposing factors leading to this increase. 
2.2.1 The HIV Epidemic 
The increase in new TB infections correlated with those population groups 
which experienced increases in HIV. The socio-economic, age and geographic 
location factors of those groups which have the greatest growth of TB are 
similar to those with HIV. Table 3 shows the latest data concerning the growth 
of HIV. 
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A comparison of Tables 1 and 3, confirms the parallel increasing growth of 
TB and HIV within the same groupings. The male sex and the middle age 
groupings show the greatest number of new cases in both TB and HIV infection 
in the United States. As TB is a disease which becomes reactivated when the 
natural immunosuppressant system weakens, these correlations between HIV & 
TB are to be expected. 
One study conducted by the CDC in 1990 and 1991 examined multidrug 
resistant TB outbreaks in six hospitals. Of a total of 200 patients, most had 
HIV or AIDS and showed the clinical signs of active TB varying from two weeks 
to several months. The mortality was 72% to 89%, death usually resulted in 
four to 16 weeks following diagnosis of TB (10). 
The CDC recognized the immunological association between HIV and TB 
and added TB to its list of AIDS indicator diseases in December 1992. With 
this addition, TB joined 24 other diseases found to be prevalent in AIDS cases. 
This correlation will further enhance collaboration between TB and HIV/AIDS 
programs and allow preventative therapy to be provided to HIV contact 
individuals who test TB positive (18). 
2.2.2 Multidrug Resistant Tuberculosis 
A study conducted in New York City in 1991 indicated that 33% of TB cases 
were resistant to at least one antibiotic and 19% were resistant to both isoniazid 
and rifampin (19). One strain was found to be resistant to seven drugs (10). Of 
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the total cases in 1991, multidrug resistant TB (MRTB) accounted for 6.9% of 
cases, a increase from 3% for the period between 1982 and 1986 (19). This 
significant increase of a bacterial mutated strain during such a short time frame 
has the public health community concerned. 
MRTB is a result of a spontaneous genetic mutation. The cause of resistant 
strains is most often the result of the non-compliance with patient's medications, 
which allows the mutated strains to multiply while antibiotics, which may still be 
effective, are not taken. The drug resistant property is unknown at the start of 
a treatment regiment and can only be determined following an in-vitro culture 
examination which may take several weeks. A study of the infection rates of 
MRTB vs TB found the rates to be approximately the same (19). The CDC has 
recommended an initial treatment course of four different antibiotics to combat 
the current strains of TB. 
The impact of these MRTB strains upon the resurgence of TB in general is 
two-fold. First, the MRTB's are more difficult to cure as multiple drug 
regimens are required, and close supervision is needed to assure that the patient 
consumes all required medications so as not to permit the evolution of another 
drug resistant strain. Second, the economic impact associated with the 
administration of these drug programs deprive other areas of funds which may 
be utilized in education and/or prevention. The impact of MRTB will be 
discussed in a future chapter. 
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2.2.3 Foreign Born Persons Entering the United States 
The Advisory Committee for the Elimination of Tuberculosis has recognized the 
impact of foreign born individuals entering the US who have TB or who come 
from countries which have a high prevalence of TB. This development has 
prompted the CDC to issue a set of recommendations in December 1990. In 
1989, the CDC projected that the TB incidence rate for the overall US 
population was 9.5 persons per 100,000 and the incidence rate among foreign 
born persons entering the US to be 124 persons per 100,000. Most of these 
individuals immigrated from one of six countries: Mexico, Philippines, Vietnam, 
South Korea, Haiti or China. Data available on illegal aliens is not available; 
however, it is estimated that a high prevalence also exists within that population 
group since they often stem from the lower socioeconomic groups of their home 
countries which also tend to have a higher prevalence of TB similar to those in 
the US. 
Currently, a physical examination conducted by physicians appointed by the 
local consulate is required for those who wish to immigrate permanently to the 
United States. The examination includes the taking of a medical history, a chest 
X-ray for those 15 years of age or older (or a TB skin test for those younger 
than 15 if the adolescent's family member has active TB or if the child is ill). 
If the immigrant is determined to have TB, the physician may classify the 
patient either as Class A or Class B depending upon the disease's 
communicability. Class B, "Tuberculosis, not considered active" is given if the 
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comparison of a old chest X-ray from at least three months ago shows no 
changes or, Class A, "Tuberculosis active, non-communicable for travel 
purposes" for those individuals who do not have a previous X-ray and who test 
negative for AFB in two consecutive sputum smears. Class B individuals may 
receive their visas, but Class A must receive a waiver from the local consulate 
to enter the US. Both classes must follow up with visits to the local public 
health boards if permitted to travel to the US. The philosophy of the current 
procedure is to exclude those who are actively contagious and begin treatment 
until a time when they are no longer communicable, and to help manage the 
illness once they arrive in the US. The CDC has identified several areas of the 
present policy which are problematic. 
Various problems cited include several aspects of the procedure. The 
misdiagnosis of the condition as a result of incorrect interpretation of the chest 
X-ray, clerical errors, fraud by the applicant in providing "doctored" or 
purchased normal X-rays, or failure to produce sputum samples when requested. 
The physical exam is valid for one year, which would tend to exclude identifying 
those individuals who may have contracted TB some time after their physical 
exam. The failure of immigrants to report for follow up exams with domestic 
health departments upon arrival in the US has been identified to be as large as 
one third for both Class A or Class B infected individuals. When follow-up was 
made in the US, it was found the classification between A's and B's was often 
in error, possibly as a result of crude techniques utilized overseas. Those 
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treated in their home countries may have developed multi-drug resistant TB as 
a result of inadequate treatment because of the limited resources available. Only 
immigrants who desire permanent residence are required to submit to a physical. 
This step excludes most students or those with temporary visas. Cases were 
found where some immigrants entered the US on a temporary basis specifically 
for TB treatment. This further taxes the health care system. Finally, the 
problems associated with increasing numbers of illegal aliens and the language 
barriers which exist between the health officials further hamper the proper 
management of the illness in the US. For these reasons, the CDC has proposed 
a number of modifications to the current system. 
In order to mitigate many of the problems described above, various 
recommendations were made. The CDC still recommends that chest X-rays and 
skin testing should still be required for immigrants; and those who test positive 
should all be considered Class A, thus eliminating the Class B diagnosis 
overseas. This allows public health authorities in the US to further classify the 
illness and recommend appropriate treatment. For those individuals who have 
positive AFB sputum smears, treatment should begin overseas until negative 
smears are obtained in two consecutive days, and only then should a waiver be 
granted to travel. Advanced arrangements with a local health department or 
private physician in the US who will agree to treat the illness or make the 
required follow-up examination will be required for those entering on waivers. 
Quarantine officers at ports of entry will continue to notify local public health 
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departments of the arrival of such immigrants and to anticipate a follow-up 
within ten days with the prearranged health care provider. Private physicians 
treating patients must notify the local health department within 30 days if the 
immigrant has not reported for evaluation. Those who refuse treatment should 
be quarantined as provided by law. Finally, a quality assurance program should 
be established and overseas physicians conducting screening exams for local 
consulates given a standard written procedure for the exam. Corrective action 
against the physician could be taken if these procedures are not followed. 
Refugees who seek political asylum in the US share many of the same 
infection problems as those who immigrate via regular channels. For refugees 
entering the United States from high prevalence countries in Southeast Asia, all 
ages must also undergo a TB skin test in addition to chest radiographs. They 
too must receive preventive TB therapy if their skin test is positive. All refugees 
from these areas must also follow up with local health departments upon arrival 
in the US. Refugees from other countries will follow the same procedures as 
other immigrants, but they must still follow up with local health departments 
even if X-ray abnormalities are not uncovered. 
In both scenarios the local health departments play a key role in controlling 
both the immigrant and refugee populations residing in the US. These 
departments have been charged with the task of screening, prevention and 
treatment of many of these immigrants. Needless to say, the economic 
resources required to fulfill these requirements are substantial. With three 
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quarters of foreign born arrivals settling in New York, New Jersey, California, 
Florida, Texas and Illinois, these regions are especially hard hit. In order for 
the ACET to realize their proposal to eliminate TB in the US by 2010, the 
entire health care infrastructure must be examined. 
2.2.4 Health Care Infrastructure 
The health care infrastructure encompasses a broad spectrum which includes the 
facilities and personnel of hospitals, clinics, private offices, dental offices, 
emergency medical services, the public health service, administrative policies, 
governmental legislation, private accreditation and even the training and 
education provided to employee and patient alike. As with any chain, it is only 
as strong as its weakest link. One of the weaker links within the system appears 
to be the inability to diagnose active TB early. Late detection enables the illness 
to be needlessly transmitted to other persons including family members, 
hospitalized patients or health care workers. 
The data suggest that the highest populations of new cases of TB have 
occurred within those socio-economic groups which belong to the lower classes 
and who live in urban areas where the local hospital emergency department 
(ED) serves as the primary care facility. Most of these facilities are over taxed 
caring for the normal emergency case load. The early symptoms of TB are very 
subtle and even when noticed, may be confused with many other maladies. In 
a busy ED, the likelihood of a misdiagnosis is multiplied causing other patients 
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and health care workers to be exposed to a communicable aerosol. Recent 
attempts to prevent such over-crowding of ED's in urban areas include the 
establishment of satellite clinics where a continuity of care may be provided. In 
these settings preventative medicine may also be applied, and a more rapid 
diagnosis of TB established with routine testing. Once identified, those 
diagnosed with TB may be referred to special clinics for those diagnosed with 
HIV or TB. These facilities assure that the most current and continuous level 
of care may be provided for such patients. 
CHAPTER 3 
TREATMENT OF TUBERCULOSIS 
3.1 Historical View and Early Treatments 
The Romans believed climate influenced the prognosis of phthisis and the cure 
was to be found only in a warm thy climate. Hence those afflicted that have 
financial means would travel to Egypt or Sicily. Long sea voyages and the warm 
ocean air inhaled by the patients was thought to be a cure. The Greeks believed 
that nutrition and fluid intake played a key role in the cure of phthisis. Galen, 
early in the first century indicated that consumptive patients should occupy a 
cool, well ventilated underground room (4). Many believed that sunshine was 
the surest cure and recommended habitation in sunny southern climates. This 
theory was later justified by scientific evidence as Koch demonstrated that the 
Mycobacteria tuberculosis in culture form was shown to die when exposed to 
sunlight. Diet and absolute bed rest was stressed by others, contrary to those 
who believed the consumptive patient should exercise regularly. 
Obscure cures utilized prior to the age of modern medicine included the 
drinking of woman's, goat's, cow's or ass' milk. The remedies of an early 
Roman naturalist named Pliny, suggested the intake of a wolfs liver boiled in 
wine, inhaling smoke of burning cowdung through a reed, the drinking of 
elephant's blood mixed with the milk of a woman or ass or the eating of mice 
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boiled in salt and oil (2). Cold bathing and "breathing into a hole fresh cut into 
the earth" was recommended by John Wesley in the eighteenth century. 
Primitive attempts at early chemotherapy included treating patients with salt 
compounds of iron, sodium chloride, chlorine gas, digitalis, creosote, iodine and 
preparations of gold and silver. All of these compounds proved ineffective 
against curing TB and in many cases, actually caused complications (4). 
In retrospect the most effective of these early treatments proved to be 
convalescence in better climates, good nutrition and the advocacy of proper rest 
augmented with slight exercise. These methods were combined leading to the 
eventual development of the sanatoria, after the Latin word sanare meaning to 
cure or heal. 
3.2 The Sanatorium 
In the early 1800's a young botanical student named Hermann Brehmann 
suffered from TB and was told by his doctor to convalesce in a better climate. 
Brehmann left Germany for the Himalaya Mountains where he conducted 
botanical research. He ultimately recovered and returned to Germany to study 
medicine. He presented his findings regarding TB to the medical community 
in 1854 in his thesis entitled Tuberculosis is Curable (5) and settled in 
Görbersdorf. There he built a house in the middle of a pine forest where he 
treated TB patients with nourishment and life in the open air. Although 
sanitoria were establish prior to Görbersdorf, the techniques Brehmann utilized 
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met with success and became the model for sanitoria for many years. The 
typical treatment utilized was to first rest the patient until the fever subsided. 
Once the fever broke, exercise was introduced, gradually at first, and then 
increased to a level allowing for completion of a day's normal activities. 
Edward Trudeau MD, said to be the American pioneer of TB, was one of 
the first to successfully develop a sanatorium philosophy domestically. Trudeau, 
who himself was infected with TB, was not satisfied with his grave prognosis and 
set out to find a successful treatment. He left for the Adirondack Mountains 
near Saranac Lake, New York where he could rest and "lead a open-air life in 
the great forest, alone with nature". In 1885, he established the Adirondack 
Cottage Sanatorium and committed himself to the study of TB. The sanatoria 
and specialized hospitals spread quickly across the US in the late nineteenth 
century. One of the first specialized hospitals established in the United States 
was the Chestnut Hill Hospital in Philadelphia in 1886. Specialized wards 
previously had been established at Bellevue Hospital and City Hospital in New 
York City. 
The period of the sanitorium lasted for many decades. The quality of life 
for many improved because of the rest and fresh air provided at the sanitorium. 
Perhaps the greatest contribution of the sanitorium system, was the 
consolidation of resources and sharing of knowledge towards the research and 
care for those inflicted with TB. The establishment of professional societies like 
the National Tuberculosis Association and the sponsoring of International 
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Conferences enhanced cooperation among the medical community. Work 
stemming from these organizations aided in public health campaigns, early 
detection through the use of X-rays, and public education. 
With the advent of chemotherapy, the need for long convalescence at 
sanitoria or specialized hospitals ended. Initial therapy would now be started at 
general hospitals followed by care given at home. Where once long waiting lists 
existed at the turn of the century, beds were now vacant at TB sanitoria. By 
1960, most of these facilities were closed or converted into old age convalescent 
centers. 
3.3 Early Surgery 
Surgical methods introduced at the sanatorium included the artificial 
pneumothorax, thoracoplasty, lobectomy or pneumonectomy. These techniques 
were performed for more difficult cases where rest and fresh air did not relieve 
the symptoms. Surgeons typically developed new techniques in the military and 
passed this knowledge on when returning to private practice. 
The artificial pneumothorax developed by Carlo Forlanini in 1888 
introduced a pressurized gas between the layers of the pleura which would cause 
the lung to collapse. The theory was to induce a forced rest of the lung. The 
artificial pneumothorax could only be performed on one lung at a time and was 
not sustained for long periods since the lung would tend to reinflate. The 
thoracoplasty perfected later would collapse the rib cage by removing portions 
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of the ribs thereby making the pneumothorax more permanent. 
Other procedures such as lobectomy and pneumonectomies were developed 
as advanced surgical techniques advanced. These techniques would facilitate the 
removal of a deceased lung or portions of deceased lungs and relieve some 
symptoms in the more serious cases. However, these procedures were not 
available to all, nor did they provide a cure for TB. Only with the advent of 
modern chemotherapy was a cure for TB found. 
3.4 Modern Chemotherapy and the Development of Streptomycin 
Research in the late 1800's demonstrated that tuberculocidal agents exist in 
fresh unsterile soil. Bacteria, actinomyces or fungi in the soil were identified as 
the possible agents. Experiments conducted in Europe had TB patients inhale 
these microbes, where others injected the microbes randomly into rabbits. 
Veudremer, in 1910, injected 200 patients with a extract of a fungi in Paris. The 
results showed evidence that Mycobacteria tuberculosis is sensitive to some 
products of fungi. However, the medical community at the time did not exploit 
the findings. 
Selman Waksman, a soil microbiologist, confirmed the Mycobacteria 
tuberculosis consumption process occurring in soil in 1935. Further research by 
Waksman was delayed for eight years due to a lack of funding and interest in 
the area. In June 1943, Waksman met with representatives from various 
pharmaceutical companies, the Saranac Laboratories and the National 
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Tuberculosis Association. The scientific interest and financial backing was now 
in place for research and development in effective chemotherapy. 
Waksman systematically analyzed the various organisms found in soils and 
dusts. He concentrated on actinomycese as he had conducted research in this 
area as an undergraduate at Rutgers and as a graduate student at the University 
of California. Waksman and his staff isolated several antibiotics from specimens 
during his research; however, they were found to be too toxic when administered 
to laboratory animals. Finally, in September 1943, streptomycin (SM) was 
isolated and was found to be less toxic than previous strains. Streptomycin was 
used in the control of various infections and was confirmed to be effective 
against TB in humans at the Mayo Clinic. 
Clinical tests were conducted in 1944 in conjunction with the Merck 
Company and the Mayo Clinic. The clinical results confirmed that streptomycin 
was effective against TB with a low toxicity to man. In 1947, the drug was 
marketed nationwide for use against TB. The death rate decreased and the end 
of TB could now be foreseen; however, Waksman warned the medical 
community that resistant strains of TB would develop and additional antibiotics 
would be needed. 
3.5 Other Antibiotics 
The development of additional antibiotics was necessitated soon after the 
distribution of streptomycin for several reasons. Streptomycin did not kill the 
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medications available, home treatment could now be seriously considered. 
Other antibiotics developed included pyrazinamide (PZA), ethambutol 
(EMB), ethionamide, capreomycin and kanamycin. When given in varying 
combinations and dose regimens, existing TB cases were cured and new cases 
decreased. Typically sputum would clear of AFB within six months if the 
suggested treatment regimen was followed. Few drug resistant strains developed 
as a result of using multiple antibiotics and increased public awareness. 
However, resistant strains have developed in this decade as a result of 
inappropriate treatment overseas, the spread of the HIV virus and a weakening 
of the health care infrastructure. These resistant strains proved to be most 
difficult to cure and may require even more powerful antibiotics to combat 
them. 
3.6 Multidrug Resistant Tuberculosis 
Between 1990 and 1992, the CDC studied several outbreaks of MRTB that were 
isolated within hospitals or correctional facilities. One strain in particular was 
found to be resistant to seven antibiotics. Typically, these outbreaks were found 
in persons that were HIV positive, or in health care workers who cared for the 
patients (20). 
The pathology and mode of transmission of MRTB vs TB are the same. 
However, MRTB tends to remain infectious for longer periods, as resistance to 
treatment is initially unknown. Only through invitro cultures could the actual 
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resistance be measured and the appropriate treatment selected. This culturing 
may take several weeks, which leaves the susceptibility of the bacteria to the 
initial course of medication in question during this period. 
The CDC recognized the potential danger of MRTB strains developing and 
recently revised their recommendations regarding the initial treatment regimes 
for TB. As shown in Table 4, one of four options is recommended. 
Table 4 Regiment Options for Initial Treatment of TB Among Children and 
Adults 
OPTION 1 	 OPTION 2 
	 OPTION 3 
Administer daily INH, 	 Administer daily INH, 
	 Treat by DOT, 3 times 
RIF, and PZA for 8 	 RIF, PZA, and SM or /week with INH, RIF, 
weeks followed by 16 EMB 	 for 	 2 	 weeks PZA, and EMB or SM 
weeks of INH and RIF 	 followed 
	 b y 	 2 	 for 6 months... 
TB with HIV 
Options 	 1,2,3 can be 
used, 	 but 	 treatment 
regimens 	 should 
continue for a total of 
daily or 2-3 	 times a 	 times /week 9 months and at least 6 
week.... 	 EMB or SM 	 administration of the months beyond culture 
should be added 	 to the 	 same drug for 6 weeks, 
initial 	 regiment 	 until 
	 and subsequently, with 
susceptibility 	 to 	 INH 	 2 	 times/week 
a n d 	 R I F 	 i s 	 administration 	 of 
demonstrated. 	 administration of INH 
conversion. 
Continue treatment for 	 and RIF for 16 weeks... 
at least 6 months and 3 
months beyond culture 
conversion... 
Source: Center for Disease Control. 1993. "Initial Therapy for Tuberculosis in 
the Era of Multidrug Resistance Recommendations of the Advisory 
Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis" Morbidity and Mortality 
Weekly Report. 42 RR-7. 
Each option includes the recommendation that a TB medical expert be 
consulted if the patient remains symptomatic or has AFB positive sputum 
smears after three months of treatment. 
34 
Noncompliance with medications has been recognized as a leading cause of 
MRTB. The CDC recommended that patient needs, living conditions, 
employment status and personal preferences be considered when deciding if 
direct observed therapy (DOT) should be utilized. DOT is more typically 
applied in lower socio-economic classes where the availability of a stable life 
style may not be possible because of homelessness or unemployment. Typical 
settings where DOT is administered are at TB clinics, community health clinics, 
migrant clinics, homeless shelters, prisons, nursing homes, drug treatment 
centers, hospitals, HIV/AIDS clinics, and occupational health clinics (10). 
3.7 Summary 
Waksman summarized in his book The Conquest of Tuberculosis published in 
1964, the five stages that occurred in the search for the cure a TB: 
1.. The health resort era where patients would convalesce at 
sanitoriums typically located in a country atmosphere or in pine 
forests where the patients could inhale fresh air was the first 
stage. 
2. The bed rest era initially rested the lung, then slowly exercised 
the patient to a level where they could at least perform to a 
level of limited activity. 
3. The collapsing theory era provided the means to induce rest on 
effected lungs by a pneumothorax. 
4. The resection era followed where removal of the effected area 
of the lung was accomplished by lobectomy or resection. 
5. The chemotherapy era evolved providing effective treatment 
and the ultimate decline and cure of TB. (4) 
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Advances in technology or understanding would cause the advancement to 
the next phase. Each of these five eras overlapped in some degree as 
acceptance to the next stage was gained. Usually, patient prognosis would 
improve with each development; however, with a new era of increasing infection 
rates, this may not be the case. If Waksman were to propose his theory today, 
would he include MRTB? 
CHAPTER 4 
TRANSMISSION PREVENTION 
4.1 Historic Methods 
Debate ensued within the medical community as to the cause and 
communicability of TB, even after Koch's isolation and identification of the 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis. As late as 1952, some still believed that heredity 
played a major role in a person's relative susceptibility to TB. One of the 
earliest published commentaries regarding the highly contagious nature of TB 
was Girolamo Fracastoro's book De Morbis Contagiosis published in 1546 (4). 
Girolamo cited the analogy that TB was transmitted like a seed, remaining 
virulent for great lengths of time on the beds, clothing, and in rooms of phthisis 
patients. Girolamo proposed the use of caustics as a disinfectant wherever 
possible to destroy these seeds. Although he gave the virulence of TB more 
credit than warranted, his theory was the most contemporary of the day. Even 
the Bible describes the infectious nature of some diseases and the necessity for 
the burning or destruction of clothing and dwellings that contagious patients 
occupied. 
Sylvius, later in the sixteenth century, more accurately described the 
infectious nature of TB. He cautioned that those brought close to the air 
expired through the nose or mouth of consumptive patients may become 
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infected. Those in close contact were advised to "protect themselves against 
those who are afflicted" (21). In 1720, Benjamin Marten proposed that TB may 
be caused by "minute, living creatures". Marten indicated that casual contact 
should not be feared, but close association with a consumptive patient where 
"drawing in part of the breath he emits" should be avoided (22). Although many 
of the theories were widely published during their time, factions within the 
medical community chose not to heed the warnings and the number of 
physicians and scientists who became afflicted with TB were numerous. 
The potential communicability of TB was recognized by some national and 
local authorities. The earliest and most progressive measures taken to prevent 
further contamination within the general population were enacted in Southern 
Europe. In the Republic of Lucca, laws were enacted in 1699 which required 
the names of those infected to be reported, to permit disinfectant measures to 
be taken and to destroy certain possessions upon the patient's death. Physicians 
were required to perform autopsies upon death and families were advised to 
leave the front door open to allow an exchange of fresh air. All utensils, 
clothing and bedding were to be cleaned with lye. The rooms of consumptive 
patients were to be cleaned thoroughly and freshly painted upon death (4). 
In England, the tuberculosis dispensary system was founded in 1887. It was 
realized that TB patients who were released from sanitoria would soon relapse 
upon returning home. The dispensary provided a location where the patient 
could be given minor treatment instead of returning to the sanatorium. Nurses 
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were trained to visit the patient at home and recommend changes in life style 
which might improve their medical condition. By visiting the home, the nurse 
could also monitor the health of other family members of the household and 
facilitate rapid recognition and treatment of TB should anyone become infected. 
In 1911, when the National Health Insurance Act was enacted in England, 
the numbers of new tuberculosis dispensaries increased significantly. The 
appointment of Tuberculosis Officers to monitor and administer TB care in a 
regional manner also solidified the efforts of the nation. 
One of the more encompassing laws was passed in Italy in 1782. Salvatore 
de Rensi recounted the following: 
1.That household goods not susceptible of contamination shall 
immediately be cleansed and that which is susceptible shall at 
once be burned and destroyed. 
2. That the authorities make an inventory of the clothing in the 
patients room to be identified after his death; and if any 
opposition shall be made the person doing so, if he belongs to 
the lower class shall have three years in the galleys or in 
prison, and if of the nobility, three years in the castle and a 
penalty of three hundred ducats. 
3. The physician shall report a consumptive patient when 
ulceration of the lungs has been establish under penalty of 
three hundred ducats for the first offence and banishment for 
ten years for repetition of it. 
4. That the authorities themselves shall tear out and replaster the 
house from cellar to garret, carry away and burn the wooded 
doors and windows and put in new ones. 
5. That the poor sick shall at once be removed to a hospital. 
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6. That newly built houses shall not be inhabited within one year 
after their completion and six months after the plastering has 
been done and everything about the building operation has 
been finished. 
7. Superintendents of hospitals must keep clothing and linens for 
use of consumptive patients in a separate place. (21) 
4.2 The United States Public Health Service 
Much of the early organized work in the United States regarding the eradication 
of TB was performed by voluntary organizations and later by official agencies. 
The National Tuberculosis Association, one of the oldest voluntary health 
organizations, worked closely with the United States Public Health Service. The 
Public Health Service formed the Surgeon General's Task Force on Tuberculosis 
Control in 1963. Both agencies recognized the complexity involved in the 
eradication of TB within the United States. The stubbornness of the TB 
bacteria was the major cause. TB will often remain dormant for long periods 
and exhibit no symptoms until in advanced stages, thus providing a longer 
period for the illness to spread among others. 
With the stubbornness of TB in mind, the Public Health Service in the early 
1960's recommended a two point approach at first. The first recommendation 
was to aggressively combat existing infections and achieve the maximum number 
of cures as possible. Second, dormant TB should not be allowed to develop into 
active TB by providing prophylactic treatment and requiring follow up by 
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regional health authorities for those individuals classified at greatest risk. 
The systematic elimination of TB in children was recommended in order to 
reduce the epidemic. TB skin testing of all children upon entering school and 
investigating all family contacts of children who tested positive was 
recommended. All teachers and school employees also had to be tested 
annually, and those testing positive should subsequently have chest X-rays taken. 
To prevent the spread of TB among adolescents, recommendations were 
made that all children of fourteen years of age should be screened for TB. The 
adult population was to be screened by a chest X-ray when admission into a 
general hospital in urban centers was required for any illness. The annual cost 
for this two point plan and its screening procedures was estimated at 
approximately 65 billion dollars. 
A program of this nature would need to be continued for a minimum of ten 
years. Six recommendations were made to achieve this goal: 
1.. The United States Public Health Service should allocate the 
funding to all programs on a sliding scale. 
2. All services should be provided without discrimination with 
regards to ability to pay or legal residence of the patient. 
3. Funds should be provided by the way of teaching fellowships 
to medical schools in the areas of medicine and nursing to 
improve professional skill levels. 
4. A system utilizing the most current technology should be 
established to provide a accurate record keeping method 
regarding TB infections. 
5. Manner in which to finance the previous two items. 
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6. The continuation of the study of the epidemiologic outbreaks 
with regards to geographic location and frequency should be 
continued. (23) 
The public health programs of the 1950's and 60's met with success, as 
shown by the decline of new TB cases. However, outbreaks of additional cases 
in the mid 1980's may have been a result of decreased funding for combatting 
TB. Unfortunately the impact of budget cuts ten years ago are being offset by 
increased expenditures required in the present decade. Today, disease control 
on the Federal level continues through the US Department of Health and 
Human Services, via the Public Health Service's Centers for Disease Control in 
Atlanta. 
43 Occupation Exposure Control 
The responsibility for occupational exposure control, research, regulation and 
enforcement in the United States falls upon the Department of Labor's 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Department 
Health and Human Service's National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH). The reports of various MRTB outbreaks and the 
occupational exposure of 16 health care works to MRTB resulting in the death 
of at least five workers, prompted OSHA to develop a policy regarding TB 
exposure. In May 1992, OSHA Region II in conjunction with the NY State 
Public Employee Safety Act and Health Program, developed guidelines for the 
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enforcement of TB exposure regulations. The guidelines provided OSHA 
compliance officers information regarding their own protection during 
inspections as well as procedures for the inspection process itself. Many 
questions arose from this document, promoting the drafting of a memorandum 
to regional administrators in October 1993 clarifying OSHA's intent. These 
recommendations are to be enforced as a minimum in those states which have 
their own OSHA programs. 
The ability to enforce tuberculosis exposure regulations on employers is 
promulgated under several Federal laws. Employer responsibilities are cited in 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. Sections which have been 
applied to TB exposure enforcement include: the General Duty Provision section 
5(a)(1); Accident Signs and Tags 29 CFR 1.910.145; Respiratory Protection 29 CFR 
1910.134 ; Access to Employee Exposure and Medical Records 29 CFR 1910.20 and 
Log and Summary of Occupational Injuries and Illness 29 CFR 1904. The CDC 
document entitled Guidelines for Preventing the Transmission of Tuberculosis in 
Health Care Settings with Special Focus on HIV Related Issues has been used as 
a widely accepted standard by OSHA. 
The General Duty Provision of the OSHA Act is applicable since TB is a 
recognized health hazard and feasible abatement methods exist. Citations will 
be issued by OSHA to employers at certain facilities classified by the CDC 
where higher incidence of TB exposures have occurred. Occupational exposure 
is said to occur by two types of methods. First, exposure may occur when the 
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possibility of inhaling the exhaled air of an individual with suspected TB or 
confirmed TB exists. A suspected case may be assumed, when the patient has 
the symptoms of a productive cough, coughing up blood, weight loss, loss of 
appetite, weakness and night sweats from fever. The second type of exposure 
occurs during high risk procedures where an infected or potentially infected 
individual has a high probability of producing airborne respiratory secretions. 
The Respiratory Protection Regulations of 29 CFR 1910.134 require the 
guarding of employees against airborne health hazards. The legislation is 
primarily concerned with the provision of respirators for the workers; however, 
engineering control measures such as improved ventilation are recommended to 
be utilized first where feasible. The CDC recommends that particulate 
respirators should be used when entering rooms of individuals with suspected 
or confirmed cases of TB or when performing high hazard procedures like 
aerosolizing medication, bronchoscopy, sputum induction, endotracheal 
intubation, suctioning, autopsies and when emergency medical personnel 
transport an individual with suspected or confirmed TB. Respirators must be 
NIOSH approved high efficiency particulate air respirators (HEPA). Disposable 
respirators may be reused if their structural and functional integrity are 
maintained. A program which includes training in the proper use and care of 
the respirator must also be established. 
Warning signs shall be posted as per requirements of 29 CFR 1910.145 
Accident Prevention Sign and Tags. The sign shall be prominently displayed and 
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be posted outside all AFB isolation rooms. The message typically shall warn of 
"SPECIAL RESPIRATORY ISOLATION", or "AFB ISOLATION", or provide 
other similar warning. 
Employee exposure and medical records shall be maintained as per 29 CFR 
1910.20 Access to Employee Exposure and Medical Records. A record of TB 
testing and results shall be maintained and a subsequent evaluation or treatment 
provided must also be recorded. These records shall also be provided to the 
OSHA compliance officer on request under 29 CFR 1913.10 
TB infections and positive TB skin tests should be reported on the OSHA 
200 Log as per 29 CFR 1904, Log and Summary of Occupational Injuries and 
Illness. All routine baseline testing evaluations with positive results should be 
reported on the 200 Log with the exception of pre-employment testing. Should 
active TB develop after a positive skin test, the log should be updated to include 
this information but a new entry should not be made so as to avoid double 
counting. 
TB compliance inspections will occur as a result of employee complaints or 
be included as part of routine industrial hygiene compliance inspection. These 
inspections will occur at facilities identified by the CDC as having the greatest 
incidence of infections among workers. Such locations include health care 
settings, correctional institutions, homeless shelters, long term care facilities for 
the elderly and drug treatment centers. 
CHAPTER 5 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 
5.1 Introduction 
Administrative controls are the least desirable type to utilize in the occupational 
health and safety field since they do not act passively as engineering controls, 
but require active participation by the individuals involved. However, in the 
prevention of occupational exposure to TB the use of administrative controls is 
essential as it provides a basis to identify those infected and to initiate the other 
forms of exposure control. The education of health care workers to recognize 
early signs and symptoms of active TB is essential to prevent needless exposure 
to airborne TB bacilli prior to a clinical diagnosis of TB. When identified, the 
patient may be placed on isolation procedures if active TB is suspected. Patient 
education, employee medical surveillance, pre-employment screening, isolation 
guidelines, early detection, employee education and follow up of patient contacts 
are all administrative controls which should be included in a facilities infection 
control plan. 
5.2 Screening for Early Detection and Preventative Therapy 
The ideal scenario is to detect latent TB and prevent the needless exposure to 
airborne TB bacilli before it develops to a point where it becomes contagious 
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Table 5 Criteria for Preventative Therapy 
Category 
Age group (years)  
<35 	 ≥35 
With risk factor* 
≥5 mm 
No risk factor 
High-incidence groupt 
No risk factor 
Low-incidence group 
Treat all ages if reaction to 5 TU PPD ≥10 mm (or 
patient is 	 recent contact, 	 HIV 	 infected, 	 or 	 has 
radiographic evidence of old TB 
Treat if PPD ≥10 mm! 	 Do not Treat 
Treat if PPD ≥15 mm++ 	 Do not treat 
* Risk factors include HIV infection, recent contact with infectious person, recent 
skin test conversion, abnormal chest radiograph, intravenous drug abuse, and 
certain medical risk factors. 
t High incidence groups include foreign born persons, medically undeserved low 
income populations and residence of long term care facilities. 
Lower or higher cut off points may be used for identifying positive reactions, 
depending on the relative prevalence of TB infection and non specific cross-
reactivity in the population 
I Measurement in millimeters of induration (upwelling or hardening, approximate 
size of a of pencil eraser) 
Source: Center for Disease Control. 1990. "The Use of Preventative Therapy for 
Tuberculosis Infection in the United States" Morbidity and Mortality 
Weekly Report. 39 RR-8. 
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to others. The CDC estimates that approximately 10 to 15 million persons in 
the United States may be latently infected with TB (11). Efforts made to identify 
and treat the latently infected through the use of Mantoux skin testing of high 
risk groups has been attempted. If early detection indicates the presence of TB, 
preventative treatment by oral antibiotics may be indicated. Usually, treatment 
may be completed at home or given on an out patient basis at a local clinic. 
Only the most serious cases would be admitted to a hospital where continuous 
medical monitoring would be required. Currently the CDC recommends that 
a preventative therapy of INH be given. Dose ranges are from 10 mg/kg per 
day for children to 300 mg daily for adults for a duration of 6 to 12 months. The 
CDC established the criteria shown in Table 5 to aid physicians in determining 
if preventative therapy is warranted. 
Patients treated at home would be educated to the importance of taking 
their medication regularly in order to prevent a resistant strain of TB or 
symptomatic disease from developing. Follow up exams would be conducted 
monthly to insure compliance with medication and to identify the presence of 
active TB should it develop. 
5.3 Education and Training of Health Care Workers 
When left undetected, those of lower socio-economic classes will often develop 
the clinical signs and symptoms of active TB and seek treatment at a busy 
hospital emergency room. In order to prevent these unrecognized exposures 
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from occurring, health care workers should be well versed in the signs and 
symptoms of TB. The early identification of a potentially infectious person is 
still paramount to the success of any infection control program. Much the same 
way that early medicine classified TB within a group of similar illnesses, the 
same occurs today as signs and symptoms may be mistaken for other diseases 
like pneumonia or bronchitis. The recognition of the potential for infectious TB 
to exist in a patient entering a health care facility must be established. When 
identified, appropriate isolation measures should be taken as to prevent the 
nosocomial transmission of the disease and physicians should order the 
appropriate diagnostic tests to confirm the clinical diagnosis. 	 Once the 
diagnostic tests are completed and the results returned, the decision may be 
made if the patient is required to remain in AFB isolation. 
The clinical findings and pathology of TB is taught in medical and nursing 
schools. The decline of new cases within the United States in the past decades 
may have caused the medical community to be less suspicious of TB infections 
in some communities. Within the past five years numerous papers have been 
published in medical journals discussing the resurgence of MRTB and its 
association with HIV. Those employed in high risk urban settings have, of 
necessity, become familiar with the clinical signs and hazards associated with TB. 
Therefore inservice education should be provided to familiarize medical 
personnel of the signs and symptoms of TB, infection control policies and 
isolation procedures. 	 Additional training regarding the use of personal 
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protection equipment and the condition of the physical plant to isolate patients 
should be reviewed. 
5.3.1 Recognition of Signs and Symptoms 
The Center for Disease Control recommends the diagnosis of active TB should 
be vigorously pursued for those patients who demonstrate the clinical signs and 
symptoms. Those patients (particularly those belonging to high risk groups) 
which exibit a persistent cough, weight loss, anorexia and fever should be 
considered suspect TB cases until further clinical testing proves otherwise. 
Diagnostic tests ordered for suspected TB patients should include a PPD skin 
test, chest X-ray and microscopic examination of sputum cultures for AFB's. 
The history and physical exam by the physician should reveal if the patient is a 
member of a high risk group or has been exposed to an individual who is a 
member of a high risk group. 
Ironically, one risk group that has had increased outbreaks of TB is also 
more difficult to diagnose as having TB. HIV positive patients often will have 
a normal chest X-ray without the presence of cavitation, and the percentage of 
false negatives associated with the PPD skin testing has also increased as the 
HIV disease progresses in an individual (8). For this reason, those who are 
known to be HIV positive are considered to have TB positive skin tests if the 
updwelling is greater than five mm as opposed to the ten mm for non HIV 
persons. 
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As of this date, the only method to positively confirm the presence of 
pulmonary TB is through culture examination of sputum samples. This process 
may take several weeks; however, new technologies are being developed which 
would provide a more rapid identification such as radiometric and genetic 
probes. Isolation procedures should not be withheld until lab results return for 
those suspected to have a high level of communicability of the illness. Patients 
treated for other respiratory maladies who did not respond to therapy should 
be considered as suspected TB infected and have the appropriate tests ordered 
and treatment initiated. If the patient had not been previously placed on 
isolation procedures, they should be implemented immediately. 
5.3.2 Evaluation of Infection Communicability 
Once a suspected case of TB is presumed, the health care provider must 
determine the level of communicability. A patient found to be infected with TB 
after testing positive to a skin test after routine screening, who has no symptoms 
or productive cough is obviously less contagious (if at all) than a symptomatic 
patient with a productive cough who arrives at a hospital emergency room 
because of shortness of breath. For this reason, a heightened level of suspicion 
should be maintained when initially triaging patients entering the emergency 
department. Proper intial placement of the patient may substantially decrease 
the unrecognized exposure of the staff and other patients alike. 
The Center for Disease Control has established a list of eight criteria to help 
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determine the communicability of TB as related by the number of potentially 
airborne bacilli expelled. These factors are: 
1. Anatomic site of disease (pulmonary or laryngeal TB, 
extrapulmonry site which includes a open lesion in which 
concentration of organisms is high or non pulmonary disease 
located in the respiratory tract. 
2. Presence of cough or other forceful expirational maneuvers. 
3. Presence of AFB in the sputum smears. 
4. Willingness or ability of the patient to cover his mouth when 
coughing. 
5. Presence of cavitation on the chest radiograph. 
6. Length of time the patient has been on adequate 
chemotherapy. 
7. Duration of symptoms. 
8. Administration of procedures that can enhance coughing. (8) 
The most contagious of patients are those with a productive cough, positive 
AFB smears and cavitation. Patients who respond to chemotherapy usually 
become less infectious within two to three weeks. For health care workers 
treating these patients, isolation procedures should be utilized until the sputum 
smears show fewer bacilli and the cough decreases. However, some patients 
remain highly infectious for the length of the illness and must remain isolated 
for longer periods. Each case must be reviewed individually as no two patients 
are alike. The above criteria are to be only used as a guideline for determining 
the infectiousness. 
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5.3.3 Isolation Procedures 
Protocols should be established for the criteria required to isolate potentially 
infectious TB patients. Typically, these procedures should be immediately 
imposed on patient's with suspected TB. Patients requiring isolation and 
admission to the hospital should be admitted to private rooms. When available, 
isolation rooms with special ventilation systems should be utilized. The patient 
should be instructed not to leave the room unless wearing an approved mask. 
The patient may be instructed to wear appropriate masks even when occupying 
the isolation room except when eating or drinking. Those caring for contagious 
TB patients must also wear approved personal respirators when occupying the 
same room. Visitors should be limited to family who have been instructed on 
isolation procedures and training on use of the appropriate respirator. 
Isolation rooms should be well identified with signs stating "AFB 
ISOLATION" or "SPECIAL RESPIRATORY ISOLATION". Visitors should 
be required to stop at the nursing station for any special instructions prior to 
entering the room. Those exposed to patient body fluids should follow the 
appropriate precautions for blood borne pathogens. The appropriate gloves, 
face shields and gowns should be worn when appropriate. OSHA Bloodborne 
Pathogens Standard CFR 1910.1030 shown in Appendix C of this document 
outline the requirements for protection from infectious fluids and substances. 
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5.4 High Hazard Procedures 
The CDC has recognized several medical procedures which are potentially high 
risk ones for the medical professional to perform without being exposed to 
respiratory tract secretions. Special recommendations have been provided to 
insure that the health care provider is protected from these potentially infectious 
secretions. 
Diagnostic sputum induction is used to collect deep sputum samples to test 
for AFB or other culture examinations. The patient is instructed to inhale and 
exhale deeply three times, then inhale swiftly and cough forcefully and 
expectorate into a sputum container. This technique allows only the deepest 
secretions and potentially the most contagious to be expectorated. The patient 
should be instructed to cover his mouth and nose and when he coughs during 
the procedure to further limit bacilli from entering the room air. The ideal 
setting for this procedure is in a special negative pressure ventilation booth or 
isolation room. The patient should remain in that area until any residual 
coughing has been resolved after the procedure. The health care worker, 
typically a nurse should wear an approved personal respirator if required to be 
in attendance during the procedure. 
Patients receiving aerosolized medication via nebulizer are also subject to 
expelling bacilli into the air. Several medications are given in this manner 
requiring the patient to deeply inhale and exhale in order to absorb the 
medication deeply into the lungs. Typically these procedures are also conducted 
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in special booths or isolation rooms. Personal respirators should be worn by the 
health care worker if in close proximity. Bronchoscopy, endotracheal intubation 
and endotracheal suctioning should also be conducted in areas which have the 
appropriate ventilation. These procedures often cause the patient to cough 
forcefully, creating the possible expulsion of TB bacilli during and after the 
procedure, thus requiring the necessity for masks and eye protection to be 
utilized by those in contact with the patient. 
5.5 Medical Surveillance 
The maintenance of medical surveillance of the employees of health care 
facilities cannot be mitigated. The benefits are two fold: the pre-employment 
PPD screening identifies the base line result of the employees's TB status and 
second, it serves as a means to screen personnel during employment and control 
outbreaks. 
Initial pre-employment Mantoux skin testing should be conducted for all 
employees at the initial physical exam. Annual testing should be provided at no 
cost to employees whose responsibilites include patient contact. 	 Those 
individuals who have high risk exposure by caring for known TB patients should 
be tested biannually. Employees previously found to have tested positive to a 
PPD test, or who are currently receiving oral antibiotc TB treatment may be 
exempted from annual skin testing. However, these persons should be closely 
monitored for the appearance of clinical signs and symptoms should the latent 
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TB become active and require treatment. 
The data collected on employee and patient outbreaks should be reviewed 
frequently to identify and stem any outbreaks within the facility. When 
outbreaks occur, exposure control policies should also be reviewed to identify 
if new policies should be established, or existing policies modified or more 
rigidly enforced. 
Special testing should be provided for those employees who had contact with 
patients who were found to have contagious TB, but were not on AFB isolation. 
A Mantoux test should be administered immediately to the employee upon 
discovery of the unprotected exposure and repeated twelve weeks later. When 
indurations greater than five mm occur or the signs and symptoms of TB are 
present, a chest X-ray should be taken. For those employees who test positive, 
preventative therapy should begin immediately and counseling regarding HIV 
antibody testing provided, as TB has been found more frequently in HIV 
positive persons. 
Work restrictions should be evaluated on a case by case basis as to the 
communicability potential of the employee. Those with infectious TB should be 
permitted to return to work only after the cough is resolved and the sputum is 
free of bacilli on smears conducted in three consecutive days. The employee 
should be closely monitored regarding the recurrence of symptoms and 
completion of prescribed treatments. 	 Those refusing to complete the 
preventative therapy and who are otherwise healthy may still return to work, but 
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should be counseled as to the possible occurrence of a drug resistant strain of 
TB (8). 
Employee medical records should be maintained as per 29 CFR 1910.20 
Access to Employee Exposure and Medical Records. Records of treatment 
provided and PPD test results should be documented. The OSHA 200 log must 
be regularly updated for positive PPD tests which occur during employment. 
Positive tests occurring at the time of the pre-employment screening are not 
considered as an occupational exposure and need not be logged. Only those 
employees who initially tested negative and then test positive PPD during 
employment should be documented. If active TB develops, the initial log entry 
of positive testing should be updated. A new entry should not be made so as 
to avoid double counting. 
All outbreaks of communicable diseases are reportable to the local Boards 
of Health as the law requires. The Board of Health will identify and notify 
suspected exposure contacts. The infection control personnel at the appropriate 
facility should assist the authorities with information regarding known contacts. 
5.6 Summary 
The CDC has recognized the importance of the administrative regulations 
required to prevent the spread of TB. In the CDC document entitled Guidelines 
for Prevention of Transmission of Tuberculosis in Health Care Settings, seven 
fundamentals are cited to reduce the transmission of TB. 
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1. Screening patients for active TB and TB infection. 
2. Providing rapid diagnostic services. 
3. Prescribing appropriate curative and preventative therapy. 
4. Maintaining physical measures to reduce microbial 
contamination of air. 
5. Providing isolation rooms for persons with, or suspected of, 
having infectious TB. 
6. Screening health care facility personnel for TB infection and 
TB. 
7. Promptly investigating and controlling outbreaks. (8) 
All but items four and five may be considered as administrative controls. The 
provision of isolation rooms and the physical measures to reduce contamination 
of the air will be discussed in the next two chapters Personal Protective 
Equipment and Engineering Controls. 
CHAPTER 6 
PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
6.1 Airborne TB Hazards 
Tuberculosis is primarily transmitted via the airborne route, although blood 
borne exposures have occurred. Microscopic aerosols of one to five microns in 
diameter may remain airborne and travel on air currents for long periods within 
a facility (10). 	 Administrative controls play an important role in the 
identification of suspected or infected persons and placement of the patient on 
isolation procedures. Most outbreaks of nosocomial transmission of TB 
occurred as a result of contact with patients with unrecognized TB. 
Transmissions occurred between patient to patient and also patient to health 
care worker in one study (20). The personal respirator serves as the only 
protection before the patient is placed in an isolation room. This is the last line 
of protection against infectious pulmonary TB occupying an AFB isolation 
room. 
As with all types respiratory exposures, the likelihood of contracting TB is 
related to the concentration of the bacilli in the air and the duration of the 
exposure by the health care worker. Theoretically, only one TB microbe need 
be inhaled to contract TB and the probability of this occurring increases as the 
concentration of the microbes is increased. Administrative controls are utilized 
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to identify those infected with the bacteria, and placing the patient in isolation 
to reduce these concentrations by the other types of controls. Engineering 
controls attempt to alter the path of the bacilli by exhausting or filtering the 
room air thereby reducing their concentration. The use of personnel protective 
equipment, i.e., personal respirators (PR) constitute receiver control as they do 
not alter the path but only protect the wearer, provided they are utilized 
properly and worn at the appropriate times. 
The CDC guidelines for wearing a PR when possible TB exposure occurs 
in three circumstances: 
1. When entering rooms housing individuals with suspected or 
confirmed infectious TB. 
2. When employees perform high hazard procedures on 
individuals who have suspected or confirmed TB disease. 
Examples of high hazard procedures include aerosolized 
medication treatment, bronchoscopy, sputum induction, 
endotracheal intubation, suctioning procedures and autopsies. 
3. When emergency medical response personnel or others must 
transport, in a closed vehicle, an individual with suspected or 
confirmed TB. (8) 
The PR's utilized must be NIOSH approved high efficiency particulate air 
(HEPA) respirators as a minimum standard. 
6.1.1 Particulate Respirators 
Although the CDC guidelines are vague with respect to the type of personal 
respirator to be utilized, OSHA requires HEPA respirators be provided as the 
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minimum protection under 29 CFR 1910.134. A respirator protection program 
must also be established at the facility under the same code. Because TB is 
considered a biological hazard, there is no permissible exposure limit (PEL) 
defined, as any exposure is considered hazardous. 	 NIOSH therefore 
recommends that powered air-purified respirators (PAPR) be utilized for a 
minimum protection level. However, OSHA recognized that PAPR's could 
interfere with patient care and therefore authorized the use of HEPA 
respirators as an acceptable standard. Both devices utilize paper element HEPA 
filtration; however, the PAPR is equipped with a powered fan which blows 
filtered air into the face piece of the user to provide further protection by 
positive pressurization. 
This option to authorize HEPA respirators by OSHA was justified for 
several reasons. There is no published data regarding the efficiency of HEPA 
in filtering TB; however, tests have been conducted by NIOSH for particulate 
matter associated with a similar diameter. The aerosolized mycobacteria 
tuberculosis ranges in diameter from one to five microns. Tests conducted in 
the three respirator classes of dust/mist, dust/mist/fume and HEPA indicated 
that only the HEPA filter met the filtering requirements of particulate matter 
similar in diameter to TB in low concentration environments. 
The typical surgical mask utilized in many hospital settings is not approved 
for employee use for protection against TB. Although the cup shaped surgical 
mask may have a similar appearance to the HEPA mask, the same filtration 
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effect or fit will not be achieved. Disposable HEPA PR's may be utilized and 
reused if they retain their original cup shape after reuse. The mask may be 
fitted with one way valves to release expired air; however this type of mask 
would not be appropriate for patient use. 
Even the best mask will be ineffective if not worn or fitted properly. 
Employee training must be conducted in the use of PR's which includes fit 
testing. Either a qualitative fit testing (QLFT) or a quantitative fit testing 
(QNFT) technique may be utilized. QLFT relies on the employee to have a 
sensory response to a irritant introduced into the proximate atmosphere of the 
mask. If the employee has a response to the irritant or "tastes" the test material, 
the fit is not considered "tight" and is less effective. Less offensive fumes may 
be utilized provided they are similar in diameter to the hazard material. 
Common test materials utilized for TB testing would be either aerosolized 
sodium saccharin at three microns in diameter or isoamyl acetate. QLFT is a 
fast, inexpensive and relatively easy to perform test; however, it relies upon a 
subjective response by the individual being tested to the test material. 
The QNFT requires that the employee be exposed to a detectable non-toxic 
atmosphere. The employee dons a respirator fitted with a probe attached to a 
special instrument that measures the amount of leakage into the mask. Rather 
than a subjective response as required with the QLFT test, the instrument 
detects and measures the amount leaked yielding a quantitative fit factor as a 
result. Special equipment and training is required to conduct QNFT causing this 
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method to be more expensive. A common rule of thumb regarding fit testing 
is: the greater the difficulty of inspiration, the "tighter" the fit and the better the 
respirator. 
Several shortcomings are associated with the use of personal protection 
equipment. The hazard is not eliminated by their use, and the receiver would 
realize the full effect of the hazard if the PR fails or is not fitted properly. PRs 
often are not utilized because they are cumbersome, therefore enforcement 
policies must be enacted. Facial hair may drastically effect the fit of the device 
on the face requiring the enforcement of grooming codes. Through proper 
education and training, the employee is introduced to the hazards of TB and the 
importance of using personal respirators. 
6.1.2 Respirator Training Program 
OSHA requires that respirator training be provided under 29 CFR 1910.134. 
The training should include the pathology of TB, its signs and symptoms, a 
review of the medical surveillance program, as well as therapies and specific 
written protocols in the use of controls. The National Safety Council outlines 
a typical respiratory training program as follows: 
1. An explanation of the respiratory hazard and what happens if 
the respirator is not used properly. 
2. A discussion of what engineering and administrative controls 
are being used and why respirators must still be used. 
3. An explanation why a particular type of respirator is used. 
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4. A discussion of the function, capabilities and limitations of the 
selected respirator 
5. Instructions on how to don the respirator and how to check it's 
fit and operation. 
6. Instruction of the proper wearing of the respirator. 
7. Instruction in respirator maintenance. 
8. Instruction in recognizing and handling emergency situations. 
9. Instruction as needed for special respirator use. 
10.Regulations regarding respirator use. (24) 
If facilities are reusing disposable respirators, the training programs should 
address the point at which the respirator is considered contaminated or 
deformed and must be disposed. Although TB is predominantly transmitted via 
the airborne route, employees should be instructed that TB may also be 
transmitted by the blood borne route and universal precautions should be used. 
6.2 Universal Precautions 
The term universal precautions refers to the philosophy that all human body 
fluids are considered to be infectious and therefore should be treated with 
certain precautions. Originally adopted as a response to HIV and Hepatitis B 
(HBV) infections, the universal precautions concept encompass a broad 
spectrum that include work practice controls, personal protective equipment and 
engineering controls. Since a high percentage of those infected with TB are also 
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HIV positive, the use of these standards as promulgated by the Blood Borne 
Pathogens Standard CFR 1910.1030 are highly recommended and often required 
for all patients regardless of their HIV status. One valuable asset to the 
regulations included the requirement of providing a hepatitis vaccination free 
of charge to all employees by their employer. Disposal and marking of 
regulated biohazard waste, employee education and the use of personal 
protective equipment were also included in the regulations. 
Personal protective equipment typically includes latex gloves, gowns, masks, 
as well as eye or face shields. As a PR is required to be worn by the health care 
workers when caring for those infected with TB, these additional items should 
be utilized whenever the health care worker reasonably anticipates contact with 
body fluids. Eye protection and gowns are also needed whenever gross 
contamination may occur as during autopsies or arterial bleeding control. 
The health care worker must always remain suspicious and treat all patients 
as if they are infected with a contagious illness. Latex gloves should be worn 
when contact with any body fluid is anticipated. Drawing blood, starting IV's, 
changing bed pans and handling soiled linen are situations where barrier 
protection in the form of gloves should be utilized. Frequent hand washing 
after patient or cultural contact has been made also decreases the risk of cross 
infection. Accidental needle sticks or splashing of body fluids onto unprotected 
health care providers should be reported so that the required prophylactic 
treatment or examination may be initiated. 
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Figure 3 The Ventilation system at a Viel loge in Salpêtrière, France 
Source: Thompson John D. and Goldin Grace. 1975. The Hospital: A Social and 
Architectural History. New Haven & London. Yale University Press. 
Figure 4 Hospital ward design for Johns Hopkins Hospital, 1875. 
Source: Thompson John D. and Goldin Grace. 1975. The Hospital:• A Social and 
Architectural History. New Haven & London. Yale University Press. 
CHAPTER 7 
ENGINEERING CONTROLS 
7.1 Introduction 
Ventilation within hospitals wards was recognized early in medical practice as 
a method to combat the spread of infection and aid in the cure of some 
diseases. Florence Nightingale recognized the adverse effects that the poor 
natural ventilation provided in her book entitled Notes on Hospitals (25). 
Patients were housed in large pavilions and treated in wards with perhaps a 
dozen other patients during her time. Ventilation was provided by opening 
large windows permitting natural outside breezes to blow through or out a 
central vent in the ceiling. More progressive designs allowed for the air currents 
within the structure to be drawn into a vaulted attic and out through the 
ventilation dome in the roof. Figure 3 shows the ventilation system of smaller 
"loges" designed by Charles Francois Viel in France in the 1780's where fresh 
air was drawn through the doors and windows and exhausted through the dome 
on the roof 
Other designs provided a central fireplace which would draw the ward air 
up the chimney on warm currents. This fire would burn year round regardless 
of weather conditions outside, for ventilation purposes and hot water. Figure 
4 shows the floor plan of a hospital ward, note the centrally located fireplace 
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and numerous windows between each bed side. 
The ventilation within any health care facility serves two basic purposes. First, 
the system must protect the patient from the contaminated air of others and 
second the system must protect the air supply from an infectious patient. Early 
attempts to achieve these measures involved removing highly infectious patients 
from the general wards to crude isolated rooms which were freely ventilated. 
When isolated rooms were unavailable, infectious patients were often moved 
closer to the fire so the infectious vapors could be pulled up the draft through 
the chimney (26). 
Dr. Stephen Smith of New York realized that patients should be separated 
by their degree of contagiousness as well as by sex and age. As the pavilion 
style hospital grew and multiple wings were built, each housed one particular 
type of patient. Ventilation technology also progressed as hospitals grew. The 
Johns Hopkins Hospital built in 1877 utilized several types of ventilation 
techniques. One method facilitated the drawing of fresh air from a well 
ventilated basement by convection across heated coils mounted on the basement 
walls, through a duct venting at the patient's bedside. The foul air in the ward 
was removed through vents located under the patient's bed which conveyed the 
air through an iron tube mounted across the basement ceiling to the ventilating 
chimney. A coil of heated tubing at the end of this vent near the chimney 
accelerated the air to provide a draft. A crude heat exchange would occur as 
the iron tube warmed the fresh air in the basement without mixing with the foul 
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exhausted ward air. In the ceiling of the ward, six 2' x 2' vents leading into a 
12" tube conveyed the foul air across the ceiling into the chimney to draw off 
the air. These ceiling vents usually remained closed during the winter to retain 
the heat. 
As the wards were stacked in several stories, the technology to ventilate them 
also advanced. The central ventilation chimney still remained with an open fire 
but additional ventilation shafts and tubes were constructed in the main chimney 
to facilitate the drawing of foul air from the additional wards. Elevators and 
other direct shafts between floors were purposely avoided to prevent the 
movement of air from ward to ward. 
As advances in architecture and mechanical ventilation systems developed, 
the hospital evolved into a skyscraper to provide more efficient use of central 
services. The Beaujon Hospital constructed in Paris in 1935 was one of the first 
skyscrapers built. The central fire and ventilating chimneys once commonplace 
in a hospital ward were replaced with mechanical fans and elaborate duct 
systems to provide fresh air and exhaust the foul air. At the Beaujon facility, 
the TB ward was located at the top of a twelve story structure. Patients could 
be placed on sun drenched balconies specially constructed for the sunshine cure 
without obstruction from the facade of the building. 
As a result of modern ventilation, special rooms could now be constructed 
to isolate highly infectious patients. The evolution of central heating and air-
conditioning now provided rooms with a comfortable environment to convalesce. 
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7.2 Modern Ventilation 
The move away from natural breezes and thermal drafts to ventilate hospitals 
gave way to forced air as developments in mechanical systems were made. The 
ability to ventilate areas without reliance on weather conditions allowed the 
interior design of hospitals to change and permitted the construction of 
windowless central areas. Specialized ventilation systems would provide clean 
air for the operating theater and exhaust the harmful fumes from labs and 
isolation rooms. 
A ventilation system may be utilized to heat, cool and supply make-up air 
or remove a contaminant to improve air quality. The simplest system consists 
of an air moving device, (a fan) and a distribution system (a duct). Humidifiers, 
air conditioning, heaters, air cleaning and filtering devices may be added to 
upgrade the simplest system. Typical temperature ranges within a hospital are 
maintained between 68 and 80°F with a 30 to 60% relative humidity. 
A modern hospital ventilation system must be able to complete the following 
four criteria: 
1. heating and cooling 
2. contamination removal 
3. contamination dilution 
4. make-up air supply (27) 
When these criteria are achieved, and the system is well maintained it will 
protect the patients from exposure to contaminated air and also protect the 
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hospital from its contaminated patients. In order to understand what is entailed 
in a simple ventilation system a brief discussion of some basic principals is 
required. 
The movement of air by a ventilation system requires an expenditure of 
energy. This energy is transformed into wind velocity which may be measured 
by means of the increase in pressure across two points. Both kinetic and 
potential energy are the components of this pressure. The energy relationship 
is expressed as in equation 7.1 below. 
TP = Total Pressure 
SP = Static Pressure 
VP = Velocity Pressure 
1 & 2 are measurement points, 2 being down stream 
Static pressure is defined as a force which is said to "blow" in a duct in a 
positive pressure system; or the force to "collapse" a duct in a negative pressure 
system. Velocity pressure is the energy that causes air in the system to flow 
much like kinetic energy. Static pressure is easily measured by tapping a duct 
with a manometer and directly reading the pressure. Total pressure is measured 
by use of an impact tube which allows direct reading of the pressure value. The 
velocity pressure may be calculated from equation 7.1 or directly determined 
with the use of a picot tube. Once the VP is known it may be converted into 
the more functional value of velocity by the following relationship shown in 
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equation 7.2. 
V = Velocity (feet per second) 
VP = Velocity Pressure (inches of water) 
The velocity may also be measured directly with thermal anemometers. With 
this value now calculated, the air flow in the duct can be measured by equation 
7.3. 
Q = Air Flow (cubic feet per minute) 
A = Area of Duct (square fret) 
V = Air Velocity (feet per minute) 
Once the air flow in the duct is known, the existing capacity and effectiveness 
of a hospital system may be determined. The dilution and removal rates of 
room air are expressed in air changes per hour by dividing the value calculated 
as air flow, by the room volume and multiplying by 60. 
7.2.1 Dilution and Removal 
Most industrial ventilation systems were designed without the removal of 
contaminants as a design criteria. Recent concerns about indoor air quality 
have prompted consideration of this factor during design and subsequent 
application of the technology required. Today, most new ventilation systems 
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Table 6 Contaminant Removal Efficiencies per Air Changes per Hour 
Mins. required for a removal efficiency of 
Air Changes/hr 90% 	 99% 	 99.9% 
1 138 276 414 
2 69 138 207 
3 46 92 138 
4 35 69 104 
5 28 55 83 
6 23 46 69 
7 20 39 59 
8 17 35 52 
9 15 31 46 
10 14 28 41 
11 13 25 38 
12 12 23 35 
13 11 21 32 
14 10 20 30 
15 9 18 28 
16 9 17 26 
17 8 16 24 
18 8 15 23 
19 7 15 22 
20 7 14 21 
25 6 11 17 
30 5 9 14 
35 4 8 12 
40 3 7 10 
45 3 6 9 
50 3 6 8 
Source: Center for Disease Control. 1990. "Guidelines for Preventing the 
Transmission of TB in Health Care Settings" Morbidity and Mortality 
Weekly Report. 39 RR-17. 
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provide some type of mechanism to insure the quality of the indoor air, 
particularly in closed buildings like modern office buildings or skyscrapers. 
One of the simplest methods to achieve this goal is by dilution. Dilution 
provides addition of fresh uncontaminated air into the ventilation system rather 
than recirculating the same air. A percentage of the stale air is exhausted 
outside, while the remaining is mixed with fresh intake air. The objective of this 
technique is to reduce the level of concentration of a contaminant or toxin to 
acceptable threshold limit values (TLV's in ppm). A mathematical model shown 
in equation 7.4 does exist to calculate the required ventilation rate given a value 
for the TLV assuming the returning air is free of contaminants. 
Q = Ventilation Rate (cubic feet per minute) a = Specific Gravity 
ER = Evaporation Rate (pt/hr) MW = Molecular Weight 
K = Safety Factor 
As with all biological hazards, the TLV for TB is zero, meaning that there 
is no acceptable level, and all contaminants must be removed, making equation 
7.4 inapplicable. Special systems which exhaust all room air to the outside for 
isolation rooms containing biohazards like TB. Tabulations have been made 
regarding the efficiency of air borne contaminants removed as expressed in air 
changes per hour. Table 6 shows the theoretical data assuming perfect mixing 
of air as presented by the CDC in their Guidelines for TB Prevention. 
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Table 7 Selected Pressure & Ventilation Relationships of Hospital Areas 
Pressure 
Relationships 
to Adjacent 
Minimum 
Air Changes 
Of Outdoor 
Minimum 
Total Air 
Changes per 
All Air 
Exhausted 
Directly to 
Recirculated 
Within 
Room 
Functional Space 	 Areas Air per Hour Hour Outdoors Units 
Surgery and Critical Care 
Operating room 
(all outdoor air) 15 15 YES NO 
(recirculating air) 5 25 OPT NO 
Delivery room 
(all outdoor air) 15 15 
(recirculating air) 25 
Recovery room E 2 6 OPT NO 
Nursery suite P 5 12 OPT NO 
Trauma room t P 5 12 OPT NO 
Nursing 
Patient room* ± 2 4 OPT OPT 
Toilet room N OPT 10 YES NO 
Intensive care P 2 6 OPT NO 
Isolation ± 2 6 YES NO 
Isolation alcove++ ± 2 10 YES NO 
Labor and delivery E 2 4 OPT OPT 
Patient Corridor* E 2 4 OPT OPT 
Ancillary 
Lab, general N 2 6 YES NO 
Lab, bacteriological N 2 6 YES NO 
Lab, pathology N 2 6 YES NO 
Autopsy N 2 12 YES NO 
Diagnostic and Treatment 
Exam room* ± 2 6 OPT OPT 
Medication room P 2 4 OPT OPT 
Treatment room* -4- 2 6 OPT OPT 
Service 
Laundry N 2 10 YES NO 
Soiled linen sorting N OPT 10 YES NO 
P = Positive N = Negative ± = Continuous directional control not required* OPT = Optional 
t The term trauma room as used here is the first aid room/and or emergency room used for general 
initial treatment of accident victims. The operating room within a trauma center that is routinely 
used for emergency surgery should be treated as a operating room. 
The isolation rooms described in these standards are those that might be used for infectious 
patients in the average community hospital. The rooms are either positively or negatively 
pressurized depending on the patient... 
* Although continuous directional control is not required, variations should be minimized and in 
no case should a lack of directional control allow the spread of infection from one area to another. 
Boundaries between functional areas should have directional control. 
Source: American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning 
Engineers. 1991. 1991 ASHRAE Handbook. Atlanta. 
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The CDC recognizes the recommendations for the minimum number of air 
changes per hospital area by the American Society of Heating and Refrigeration 
and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) shown in Table 7. The emergency 
department, including its waiting area, is recognized as being one of the highest 
contaminated areas of the hospital. This results from the contaminated condition 
of many patients and the high traffic volume (28). The classification of trauma 
rooms is deemed similar in nature to the emergency treatment area of a hospital 
requiring a minimum of twelve air changes per hour. ASHRAE recommends 
a minimum of ten air changes per hour be provided hourly for the waiting room 
and the area to be negatively pressured to prevent the contamination of other 
hospital areas. 
7.2.2 Air Mixing 
Another component of ventilation relates to the air mixing which must occur in 
the ventilated room. Air mixing refers to the movement of air currents within 
the room which prevent foul, stagnant air from collecting in poorly circulated 
spaces within a room. The most ideal air supply is overhead with the exhaust 
at the floor level. This method allows the freshest air to be provided in the 
breathing or working zone and the contaminants to be pulled downward. 
Some experts believe that the movement of air within some isolation rooms 
should be laminar and not turbulent flow (29). The flow in most hospital and 
industrial settings is turbulent with the exception of operating rooms and ultra- 
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clean rooms utilized in some types of demanding manufacturing. 	 A 
dimensionless quantity called the Reynolds number is derived by equation 7.5 
and utilized to determine the type of flow characteristic. 
Re = Reynolds Number, D = Duct Diameter (feet) 
e = Fluid Density (lb/ft3), µ = Fluid Viscosity (pound seconds per square feet) 
Once this value is calculated, the flow type is determined by the following 
criteria: 
Re < 2100 Laminar flow 
2100 < Re < 4000 Transition flow 
Re > 4000 Turbulent flow 
The transition flow refers to a region where the flow may be laminar at times 
while periodically returning to a turbulent type of flow. 
7.2.3 Flow Direction 
The direction of flow refers to the movement of air from rooms or areas 
occupied by patients in adjacent areas. Isolation rooms which are used by TB 
patients are typically designed to protect the hospital air supply. To achieve this 
goal, a negative pressure is induced in the patient's room which would cause the 
air to flow from adjacent areas into the room. This effect is created by 
supplying less air into the room via the ventilation system and exhausting a 
greater volume thereby creating a negative pressure by drawing air from outside 
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sources such as corridors or alcove rooms. 
However, simply drawing air from a corridor into an isolation room may be 
introducing unwanted contaminants into the isolation room. TB patients are 
often infected with HIV and potentially contaminated air drawn from a common 
corridor may expose the patient with immunodeficiency to other potentially 
lethal infectious bacteria. Most modern isolation room designs have a specially 
ventilated ante-room or alcove at the room exit to the corridor. This room is 
usually ventilated with opposite pressurization from the isolation room. Larger 
urban teaching hospitals often have special isolation wards established with 
elaborate ventilation systems which may allow the adjustment of the 
pressurization of the isolation room, the ante room and the corridor depending 
on the type of isolation desired. 
Proper ventilation is difficult to maintain and must be closely monitored. 
The opening of doors and windows or changes in temperature can drastically 
effect the pressure differentials. Modern control systems utilizing automatic 
digital technology and continuous closed loop system monitoring requiring no 
human intervention are the ideal. 
7.3 Filtering and Irradiation 
Air exhausted from a TB isolation room must be vented directly to the outside 
and not be recirculated. Filtering may be provided for exhaust air to limit the 
outside concentrations of contaminated air from being too great if required by 
74 
local regulations. The outside vent should never be located near other patient 
areas, air intakes, animals or plants. 
Areas like the emergency department or X-ray department may sometimes 
be occupied by TB infected personnel. A percentage of the exhaust from these 
areas is usually recirculated into the hospital ventilation system and not 
completely exhausted. A filter or irradiation device may be placed in the 
exhaust vents from these areas to insure that infectious material is not 
recirculated through the return air system into other hospital areas. The use of 
high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are approved for such a use. 
7.3.1 High Efficiency Particulate Air Filters 
HEPA filters have been demonstrated to filter particulate matter greater than 
0.3 microns in diameter with 99.97% completion (28). Although no specific 
data exists regarding the efficiency of HEPA filters in removing tuberculosis 
bacilli, studies have proven these filters to be effective at removing aspergillus 
spores which have the same diameter as TB (30). 
HEPA filters are constructed of pleated paper or other filter material, 
bonded to a housing or frame. The intent of this filter is to trap the smallest 
of micro-particles; thus the smallest puncture or slightest separation between the 
filter material and frame reduces the efficiency of the filtering effect 
significantly. Proper manufacture, installation and testing are each essential to 
achieve the desired effect of the system. Installation should only be performed 
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Figure 5 Pressure drop tests for HEPA filter operation. 
Source: McDermott, Henry J. 1977. Handbook of Ventilation for Contaminant 
Control. Ann Arbor, Michigan. Ann Arbor Press. p.245. 
75 
by qualified personnel familiar with the use of these specialized filters. 
As HEPA filters trap nearly every particle over 0.3 microns in diameter, they 
become clogged quickly by average room dusts or other microscopic 
contaminants. Some installations may require the use of a non HEPA type 
prefilter to prevent the HEPA filter from being clogged with larger particles. 
Clogged or dirty filters may be easily detected by measuring the pressure 
differentials across the filter. ASHRAE recommends the installation of 
manometers across filtering banks so as to provide a quantitative method to 
determine the need to change filters when dirty, as opposed to direct 
visualization. As shown in Figure 5, a minimal drop in pressure occurs across 
a clean filter, with a higher differential across a dirty filter. Sudden changes in 
pressure may indicate the presence of a damaged or leaking filter. A 
maintenance program designed for the particular use should be prepared by the 
manufacturer and installer. It should detail the frequency of filter changes and 
testing. 
The ventilation system should be designed to allow the changing of HEPA 
filters without introducing contaminants into the system. Contaminated filters 
should be disposed of in accordance with local codes and legislation regarding 
regulated medical waste. ASHRAE further recommends that the high 
replacement costs for HEPA filters should not be overlooked in operating 
budgets. Means Open Shop Building Construction estimates the cost of HEPA 
filters to be eight times more than expensive than standard paper type filters. 
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7.3.2 Germicidal UV Radiation 
The use of UV lamps having a wave length of 100 to 290 nm for destroying TB 
bacilli has met with some success and also controversy. As Koch demonstrated 
soon after his isolation of the mycobacteria bacillus in 1882, sun light was shown 
to destroy TB bacteria. The use of these lamps provided an artificial method to 
reproduce this effect at a more concentrated level. In the early 1960's, Richard 
Riley of Johns Hopkins University, showed by a controlled experiment that UV 
lamps placed in ventilation ducts from rooms occupied by TB patients to cages 
occupied by guinea pigs had a lower incidence of contracting TB (31). Although 
no strong human data exists, and the same results have not been repeated, this 
technique has been utilized for decades but not without controversy. 
The use of UV lamps in patient rooms has been controversial because of 
safety concerns. Short term adverse health effects with UV lamps is caused by 
the direct exposure of humans to the damaging wavelengths with short term 
exposure causing erythema of the skin and keratoconjunctivitis. Long term 
exposure effects include basal cell carcinoma and cataracts. These effects are 
only realized if the lamp is installed in the patient's room. 
A wall or ceiling mounted unit may be placed in the patient's room in order 
to disinfect the room air. These lamps are typically mounted high near the 
ceiling to have the greatest effect in the breathing zone. The effectiveness of 
these lamps is also influenced by the movement of air within the room. The 
lamps must be left on day and night in order to achieve the desired effect. 
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When the lamps are placed directly in the ventilation ducts, the exposure to 
humans is eliminated. The UV light utilized in this area may be of higher 
intensity as there is no human exposure except during required maintenance at 
which time the lamp may be shut off. Warning signs should be placed on duct 
access doors to warn maintenance worker of the presence and dangers of UV 
light exposure. Obviously, lamps placed in the exhaust ducts will not protect the 
persons occupying the same area as the TB patient and only disinfect the 
exhaust air. 
The UV lamps should be routinely cleaned of dusts and tested as to their 
efficiency in the appropriate wave lengths. Bulbs should be replaced at the end 
of their recommended life. The CDC recommends that a timing device be 
installed as to indicate the end of the bulb life at a remote monitoring station. 
7.4 The TB Isolation Room 
The cornerstone of TB transmission prevention in a hospital setting is the AFB 
isolation room. Reserved for those with active infectious TB, these rooms are 
specially ventilated as previously described to achieve isolation by ventilation. 
Suspected or confirmed cases of infectious TB should be admitted and moved 
to these areas at the earliest possible moment. Patients should be fitted with 
approved valveless masks until the transfer to these areas is completed. 
Rooms must be single occupancy with private bath facilities and shower if 
available. At teaching hospitals, the rooms should be large enough to 
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accommodate a variety of medical equipment including a ventilator, and be able 
to hold five to seven students without anyone touching the bed. A separate 
wash basin may be provided in the ante-room or near the door for the health 
care workers to utilize upon entering and exiting the room. As uncomplicated 
cases of TB may remain infectious for two to three weeks, a window, TV and 
phone may help to alleviate the sense of confinement. Electrical service of 120 
and 208 volts should be provided in a convenient location for medical 
equipment. Medical grade oxygen, compressed air, and suction should also be 
provided at bedside. 
Windows should be sealed and locked shut, doors must be fitted with 
automatic closure devices to insure that they remain closed thereby preventing 
changes in room pressurization. When used for AFB isolation, negative 
pressurization is required; however, more versatile isolation rooms will permit 
the pressurization to be changed between negative and positive dependent of the 
patient's isolation requirement. 
ASHRAE recommends that six air changes per hour including two fresh 
outside air changes must be provided in isolation rooms. A monitoring station 
should be set up to alarm the staff if any fluctuations in pressurization or flow 
rate occur. A fail safe system which automatically activates backup power 
sources should a power failure occur should be included in the design. One 
such system would provide full exhaust on system failure with no make up 
ventilation supplied. Supply air ducts should also be fitted with HEPA filters 
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to prevent reverse migration during system failure and to filter the supply air 
provided to the room. HEPA filtration would also be required when the room 
is positively pressurized and used for non AFB isolation but for 
immunosuppressant patients. Flutter strips placed near vents and frequent 
testing with smoke tubes or smoke sticks are non mechanical methods to insure 
the desired flow direction. 
The AFB isolation rooms will often be located in separate isolation wards in 
larger teaching hospitals or clustered in the medical-surgical floor of smaller 
hospitals. The isolation rooms should be adequately identified by appropriate 
signs. The nursing station serving these rooms should be ideally located within 
view of the room to prevent unauthorized entry or exit from the area. 
Once the patient's symptoms have subsided and he or she is improving 
clinically, the patient may be moved to a private room. This usually occurs after 
three weeks of effective treatment. When the patient's sputum is free of bacilli 
for three consecutive days, he or she may be placed in a semi-private room with 
others (32). The housekeeping staff may clean the isolation rooms in the same 
manner as other hospital areas, but should wear PRs when in a AFB isolation 
room whenever the patient is present. 
7.4.1 Retrofit of Existing Facilities 
Hospitals located in smaller communities may not have any specially designed 
isolation rooms, and if so, they are usually very few in number. Existing patient 
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rooms or wards may have to be converted into isolation areas because of the 
increased demand, or to conform with state or local regulations. The greatest 
difficulty in converting these areas is installing the necessary ventilation. 
Existing exhaust vents must be sealed if they return to the general air supply of 
the hospital. Walls, cracks, windows, floors and doors should also be sealed to 
prevent unwanted infiltration. 
A new ventilation system may have to be installed which is solely dedicated 
to the space. Exhaust vents should also be located near the floor with the 
supply near the ceiling to provide desired air mixing. UV lamps installed in the 
rooms may be utilized as a secondary measure but should not replace the use 
of negative pressurization to prevent migration of airborne bacilli to other 
hospital areas. The use of alcoves or ante-rooms may permit pressurization to 
be maintained for difficult retrofits. All systems installed should also be 
equipped with fail safe monitoring systems similar to those used in new 
construction. 
7.5 Special Areas 
The CDC also recognizes the importance of maintaining proper engineering 
controls in other health care areas. Hospices, nursing homes, correctional 
facilities, ambulatory care facilities, emergency medical services and home health 
services should all adhere to the TB transmission precautions outlined above. 
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Ambulatory care facilities which care for both patients who may suffer from 
TB and HIV must use special caution when caring for these individuals. 
Patients should be firmly instructed to cover their mouths when coughing in 
common areas like waiting rooms in such clinics. Ventilation systems should be 
enhanced to provide frequent air changes and filtration by HEPA filters or 
irradiation with UV lighting. When special high hazard procedures are 
performed, they should be completed in isolation booths similar to those used 
at inpatient facilities. 	 The medical staff should be familiar with the 
administrative procedures and the use of PPE in hospitals. 
Emergency medical services must also be concerned with transporting active 
TB patients. Often EMS will be the first to contact a patient who may have 
active TB. Recognition of the signs and symptoms of TB by the pre-hospital 
care providers is essential towards utilizing the proper prevention measures to 
be taken during transport and arrival at the ED. Ambulance personnel should 
wear HEPA PR's when transporting suspected cases of active TB. Rear 
windows of the ambulance should be opened if possible; the air conditioning or 
heating unit should not be on a recycle setting and the rear exhaust vent should 
be switched on. EMS personnel, when giving reports to the medical staff at the 
receiving facility, should express their concern as to any suspicion of infectious 
TB. 
Home health care workers should also be familiar with the hazards 
associated with TB. HEPA PR's should be worn whenever caring for patients 
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with active infectious TB. If children or immuno-compromised persons live in 
the same household, measures to relocate these individuals should be 
considered. In reality, the home is an excellent setting to receive therapy as 
exposure to others is limited. With proper patient and family education, the 
quantity of airborne bacilli may be reduced by simply covering one's mouth with 
a tissue when coughing. As family members are screened for TB during the 
initial investigation, the home care worker should also monitor such individuals 
for any the signs and symptom within the family. 
Nursing homes and correctional facilities both contain populations which are 
high risk groups or have immunosuppressant illnesses. The medical departments 
at correctional facilities should adhere to the guidelines established for inpatient 
facilities regarding administrative controls, PPE and engineering controls. The 
primary concern regarding nursing homes relates to increased surveillance. New 
residents and employees should be tested upon admission or employment at 
these facilities. The CDC recommends that two Mantoux skin tests should be 
performed for a more reliable baseline result as the percentage of false negative 
results is high. Outbreaks should be reported to the local boards of health and 
identified early to stem epidemic levels which may occur swiftly in these 
confined residential settings. Local boards of health should investigate all TB 
exposure contacts where outbreaks occur as described in the CDC document 
Prevention and Control of Tuberculosis in Facilities Providing Long Term Care to 
The Elderly. 
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7.6 Summary 
Engineering controls serve as the best method to prevent the transmission of 
TB. These controls act passively and provide protection for employees and 
other patients alike. The microbial concentration of TB in the air is reduced 
thus decreasing the likelihood for exposure and preventing nosocomial 
transmission. When installed during new construction, as opposed to retrofitting 
old facilities, the higher costs of these special systems are significantly reduced. 
However, the need for improved ventilation within common areas and the 
construction of isolation rooms may only be realized as the TB epidemic grows. 
Other engineering methods may be developed as a result of research currently 
being conducted to help decrease the spread of TB among health care workers 
in the near future. 
CHAPTER 8 
FUTURE TRENDS 
8.1 Introduction 
The CDC has recognized that discontinuities exist in our current understanding 
of TB transmission in the workplace. The document entitled: Guidelines for 
Preventing the Transmission of Tuberculosis in Health-care Settings, With a Special 
Focus on HIV - Related Issues prepared by the CDC cited the need for research 
in the following three areas: 
1. Better quantifying the risk of tuberculosis transmission in a 
variety of health care settings. 
2. Assessing the acceptability, efficacy, adverse impact, and cost 
effectiveness of currently available methods for preventing 
transmission. 
3. Developing better methods for preventing transmission. (8) 
To increase knowledge in the three areas cited above, research in two separately 
distinct fields needs to be conducted. The medical community must further 
strive to explore the causes of the new resistant strains and search for a method 
to rapidly identify and treat these TB strains. The occupational safety and 
health community must analyze the value of the present transmission prevention 
techniques and research new methods. 	 Published material from the 
occupational health community is minimal; however, the medical community has 
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made some advances in identifying drug resistant strains of TB. 
8.2 Medical Research 
The use of multiple antibiotics to treat TB has again become commonplace in 
the past decade. The combinations of these medications were often selected by 
the physician from past experience of success from the eleven available 
tuberculocidal medications. This "blind" selection was necessitated because the 
cultural examination required to identify the particular drug resistance of any 
given TB strain takes several weeks or months, primarily because of the slow 
growth of the bacilli in producing enough culture to test susceptibility. New 
techniques are urgently needed to identify MRTB. 
One new technique developed at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine 
and the University of Pittsburgh (33) has shown promise in pinpointing drug 
resistance quickly. The introduction of firefly luciferace into the Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis by means of a bacterial virus called a "phage", allows the drug 
sensitivity of tuberculocidal antibiotics to be measured. The luciferace will 
literally "glow" when combined with luciferin and adenosine triphosphate (ATP) 
as an energy source. ATP is found abundantly in healthy organisms including 
mycobacterium Tuberculosis at the cellular level and less abundantly in 
unhealthy or dying cells. TB bacilli, which are dying as a result of being treated 
with an effective antibiotic, will have less ATP available for energy consumption. 
A device called a luminometer is used to measure the light emitted by various 
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culture samples treated with an individual antibiotic. The degree of drug 
susceptibility may then be determined. As William Jacobs, who is a member of 
the research team stated "If the sample was drug sensitive, the lights were out; 
and if it was resistant, the lights would go on" (34). 
Genetic modifications are currently being made which would alter the 
phages to require even fewer TB bacteria to measure drug susceptibility. The 
first experiments required approximately 10,000 bacteria, which would require 
culturing for several days from a typical sputum sample. The new genetically 
engineered phage may only require 1,000 bacteria to conduct the test, thereby 
allowing the use of the patient's sputum with no culturing. In this manner, the 
traditional month long technique to culture TB and identify drug resistance may 
be reduced to days or even hours. 
Several advantages of this new technique are obvious. Drug resistance can 
now be determined much sooner, which would decrease the length of 
communicability of the patient as time would not be wasted on ineffective 
treatment. The most effective combination of medications may be given to 
reduce the emergence of additional resistant strains. Pharmaceutical companies 
also see this technique as a potential time saver in the development of new 
antibiotics to combat TB. Where four to six weeks were previously required to 
identify potential new tuberculocidal antibiotics, this time would also be 
reduced. The research group envisions a simplified test packaged in a manner 
that would also allow its use in third world countries in order to end the 
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epidemic overseas. 
Other research conducted by the Albert Einstein College of Medicine in 
conjunction with the Wallaceville Animal research Center in New Zealand (35) 
have identified the gene which may be responsible for INH resistance. This 
suspect gene manufactures the protein which INH targets causing its 
effectiveness. When the gene is mutated, the effectiveness of INH was found 
to decrease and the strain is resistant to INH. 
This new understanding of the action mechanism for INH enables 
development of other antibiotics for use against TB. The researchers suggest 
that INH blocks the synthesis of mycolic acid, a fatty acid that is part of the cell 
wall of all mycobacterium. When the gene which is responsible for the 
production of proteins which synthesis mycolic acid is mutated, that strain of TB 
is found to be resistant to INH. Although the exact mechanism of INH is still 
unknown, these findings represent the beginning of an understanding by 
developing new techniques to sidestep the cell's resistance, or new antibiotics 
with similar actions. 
8.3 Occupational Safety and Health Research 
Published material regarding the transmission of TB in occupational settings 
prior to 1990 is limited, prompting the CDC's call for more research in this 
area. Recent studies have been published regarding outbreaks of MRTB in 
HIV hospital ward settings; however, more information must be gathered in 
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other clinical settings with regard to the risk of exposure and the benefits of 
current control methods as well as development of new control measures. 
8.3.1 Administrative Controls 
The best method available to prevent occupational exposure to TB is the early 
identification of latent TB, and providing appropriate treatments before the 
illness becomes communicable via the airborne route. The once mandatory 
testing of all school children conducted in the 1960's and 70's has been 
discontinued as a matter of policy, budget cuts and the false sense of security 
that the illness has been eliminated. Policy makers should consider the 
advantages of reinstituting or more strictly enforcing the screening of school 
children in geographic regions where TB is prevalent. Local boards of health 
must again investigate all family contacts of children who test positive to TB. 
Prophylactic or preventative treatment should be given to all those in need. 
Several papers have been published regarding the outbreaks of TB in special 
health care settings. With the greatest number of outbreaks occurring in HIV 
wards or clinics, these areas drew the greatest attention. The CDC studied 
more than 200 cases in an attempt to identify the causative factors. Occurring 
frequently between patients who shared semiprivate rooms and between 
healthcare workers before TB is diagnosed, these exposures may be preventable 
if AFB testing of sputum is accomplished soon after admission. PPD 
conversions were also found to be high among those health care workers who 
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cared for known TB patients as compared to workers employed in areas without 
TB patients. In several cases, the appropriate exposure control systems were 
either not implemented or found to be inadequate. In one clinic, rooms where 
aerosolized medication was administered were found to be positively 
pressurized, thereby blowing the aerosolized TB bacilli throughout the clinic 
exposing other patients and employees alike. 
Typically, only areas where TB patients received inpatient care or outpatient 
clinics were subject to studies. Control groups utilized in these studies often 
consisted of staff from the surgical wards or operating rooms where no 
anticipated contact with TB patients is expected. A more encompassing study 
that would include all those employees who have contact with infectious TB 
patients would be more beneficial towards completing the CDC request of: 
"better quantitating the risk of tuberculosis transmission in a variety of health 
care settings". Members of the emergency medical service, emergency 
department, home health care, X-ray technicians, laboratory service and 
housekeeping staff should be included in such a study. PPD conversions and 
possible patient contacts identified should ascertain the possible cause of the 
unprotected exposure. 
8.3.2 Engineering Controls 
The placement of a TB patient in an AFB isolation room may give a false sense 
of security to the staff. The concepts of flow direction and air changes per hour 
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are based on sound scientific data. Reducing of the concentrations of airborne 
aerosols by dilution and providing negative pressurization clearly help to control 
the path of the contaminant and reduce individual exposure risks. However, 
proper maintenance of such systems is essential, as a false sense of security may 
exist if the system fails. The cost of these ventilation systems is high and must 
be justified. The CDC has recommended the assessment "of the acceptability, 
efficacy, adverse impact and cost effectiveness" of such systems. Could these 
expensive systems be replaced safely by some other method or combination of 
methods? Will the use of HEPA filtration and UV light reduce the operating 
costs of hospitals and provide the same level of protection to the employee? 
Definitive answers to these questions are yet to be determined. 
The often cited publication regarding the use of UV irradiation dates back 
30 years to a experiment conducted at Johns Hopkins University School of 
Hygiene and Public Health (31). 	 Originally designed to quantify the 
infectiousness of air from a TB ward, the effectiveness of UV light against the 
bacilli was documented. The results indicated that no infections occurred in the 
control group of guinea pigs whose air supply passed through UV light; whereas 
the untreated ward air group had a statistically significant number which 
acquired TB. The tuberculocidal effects of UV light has been shown by other 
researchers in other laboratory settings; however, information regarding the 
equipment's use in actual clinical situations is limited. Hazards do exist when 
using these lights in patient rooms as previously discussed. 	 Clinical 
91 
experimentation to determine the most effective method of using UV in patients 
rooms should be conducted. In this manner, health care workers may receive 
the maximum benefit of such technology while caring for patients. 
The use of HEPA filtration in TB settings is based on theoretical data, not 
clinical testing with TB. These filters have been typically installed in ventilation 
systems where exhausted room air is filtered before being returned to the 
hospital reservoir air supply. A study which indicated that entire wall HEPA 
filtration units with horizontal laminar flow were effective in reducing outbreaks 
of nosocomial aspergillus infections in bone marrow transplant patients, justified 
the use of HEPA for TB by the CDC (30). Aspergillus is a systemic fungal 
disease which infects the lung. The aspergillus is two to seven microns in 
diameter and is found in grains, leaves, grasses, soil, construction and building 
materials. Following the installation of these elaborate filtration systems the 
aspergillus infections in bone marrow transplants were eliminated. The CDC 
believes that because of the similar physical size of the two microbes, and the 
effectiveness of HEPA for combatting aspergillus, a direct correlation may be 
assumed for TB. 
But several questions remain unanswered as to its effectiveness in filtering 
TB. The research was unclear if the laminar flow reduced the infectiousness of 
the aspergillus. The CDC did not determine if any differences might exist 
between H EPA's effectiveness at trapping a fungus as opposed to a bacteria. 
A definitive answer to the use of HEPA filtration in ventilation systems will only 
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be known after clinical testing with actual Mycobacteria tuberculosis. 
8.3.3 Personal Protection Equipment 
Another area which needs particular clarification is the selection of the personal 
respirator. Several agencies have different opinions as to the type of PR should 
be utilized. NIOSH recommends the use of air purifying respirators as the 
minimum level of protection against TB as the bacteria is a biological hazard 
and any exposure is considered hazardous. The CDC is vague as to the 
specificate type of PR to be utilized, stating only that it should be capable of 
filtering particles 1 to 5 microns in diameter. OSHA, which is responsible for 
the enforcement of the workplace hazards, has selected HEPA PR's as the 
acceptable standard. As with HEPA filtration, no clinical evidence regarding 
the use of HEPA personal respirators has been shown. With the HEPA PR 
sometimes serving as the only protection between the health care worker and 
the Mycobacteria tuberculosis, the importance of determining its effectiveness 
is essential. 
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1 Conclusions and Recommendations 
In 1989 the CDC published their Strategic Plan for the Elimination of 
Tuberculosis in the United States after recognizing the resurgence of the illness 
in the general population. The CDC's publication set as a goal the elimination 
of TB by the year 2010 in the United States based on the following three point 
plan: 
1. More effective use of existing prevention and control methods, 
especially in high risk populations. 
2. The development and evaluation of new technologies for 
treatment, diagnosis and prevention. 
3. The rapid assessment and transfer of newly developed 
technologies into clinical and public health practice. (7) 
Once this plan is completed successfully, occupational exposure to TB would 
no longer be an issue. However, in the interim, occupational exposures will 
continue to occur and efforts must be made to analyze the risk and reduce its 
occurrence. 
An increasing number of outbreaks of TB is occurring within the general 
population; similarly, the number of nosocomial TB infections among health 
care workers is also increasing. Health care facilities and regulatory agencies 
reanalyzed the adequacy of current regulations and existing infrastructures. At 
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many sites, the analysis indicated that prevention measures were often non-
existent or minimal at best. In some circumstances, infections may have actually 
occurred as a result of faulty ventilation which distributed infectious aerosols 
throughout the facility. 
In December 1990, the CDC published the Guidelines for Preventing the 
Transmission of Tuberculosis in Health Care Settings, With a Special Focus on HIV 
Related Issues as a response to these outbreaks. The recommendations of this 
document have been frequently cited within this thesis as they serve as the 
groundwork for preventing occupational exposure to TB. These guidelines were 
based on the best technology available at the time of publication, and called for 
additional research to be conducted. Three years have passed since the 
introduction of this document and only studies which investigated outbreaks 
among health care workers who care for TB patients continuously have been 
published. Details regarding the effectiveness and cost efficiency of these 
existing engineering methods and PPE measures have not been examined nor 
have new techniques been extensively researched. 
The following items are suggested by the author as recommendations 
concerning specific research needs and administrative measures which may 
enhance our understanding and control of TB exposure in the work place: 
1. Epidemiological studies which concentrate on all health care 
employees who have contact with patients before and after 
placement on AFB isolation should be conducted. 
A cohort study which identifies patients with a diagnosis of TB during a stay at 
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a health care facility would provide the basis for the study. Employees with 
prolonged and casual contact with TB patients would be identified, when 
possible, and monitored for TB infection. Information gathered may include the 
initial admitting diagnosis of the patient, time when AFB isolation began if at 
all, length of stay, clinical signs of communicability, types of infection control 
measures employed, areas where unrecognized unprotected exposures occurred, 
lab and autopsy results. Information regarding those employees who were 
subjected to unprotected exposures should be closely scrutinized as to length of 
exposure and potential communicability of the illness. Information of this 
nature may be obtained from patients' charts in most cases. Statistical analyses 
should be employed to determine if any correlation exists between these criteria 
for a variety of employee locations. 
2. Testing the effectiveness of HEPA filtration and UV irradiation 
in ventilation systems for the use in Mycobacteria tuberculosis 
should be conducted. 
A test may be utilized similar in design to Riley's in 1960, where TB ward air 
was drawn off into test chambers occupied by guinea pigs. A TB ward where 
the exhaust from several rooms is discharged through a single ventilation duct 
would be the most ideal. A system of louvers and baffles may be employed to 
allow the exhaust air to be segregated into test chambers with variable 
combinations of rooms to the entire ward to first enable the determination the 
baseline infectiousness of TB room exhaust air. Ward air may be vectored into 
three individual test chambers one with HEPA, UV light and untreated. Factors 
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which may be analyzed include the variable intensities of UV light required to 
efficiently destroy airborne bacilli in the duct work and the ultimate effectiveness 
of HEPA and life of the filter. Varying degrees of human exposure may be 
extrapolated by removing guinea pigs at predetermined intervals for pathological 
examination. 
3. A study which determines the effectiveness of UV lamps placed 
in the patients room should be explored. Lamp placement, light 
intensity and exposure limits are all factors which should be 
considered. 
The effectiveness of placing of UV lamps in patient rooms may be determined 
by utilizing the test chambers as mentioned in the previous recommendation. 
Once the baseline infectiousness of the exhaust from a TB ward is known, the 
UV lamps may be placed in patient rooms to determine the effectiveness by 
comparing the baseline infectiousness among the guinea pigs with the irradiated 
room air. Care must be utilized as to the placement of the lamp to avoid the 
irradiation of air in close proximity to the exhaust vent which would tend to 
skew the data. The ideal placement of the lamps would allow the destruction 
of bacilli in the rooms breathing zone as to protect those who occupy the same 
room as the patient. The safest and most effective intensities must also be 
determined. 
4. Standard testing protocols for personal respirators should be 
developed to determine the optimal type to be utilized for TB 
protection. 
Tests which determine the effectiveness of PR's for use with TB need to be 
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developed. PR's currently being utilized for TB are based on theoretical data 
related to filtration effectiveness in industrial settings determined in a loaded 
condition. This loaded condition will tend to increase the filtration effect 
possibly giving a false sense of security when new. PR's utilized in the hospital 
environment are often new or clean and the need to determine the filtration 
effect at this level is necessary. Once this testing criteria is established the 
effectiveness of various PR's may be determined including the HEPA for use 
with TB. Perhaps this standard testing protocol will end the confusion which 
currently exists among the health care community as to the proper PR to utilize. 
5. Development of stand alone filtration technologies for use in 
patient rooms may provide a temporary alternative to permanent 
exhaust systems. 
Technology of this nature may reduce the concentration of airborne 
contaminants in patient rooms by circulating air through HEPA filters or across 
high intensity UV lamps by means of a fan. The device may be utilized where 
temporary air filtering measures may be required in the emergency department, 
X-ray department or also where appropriate ventilation systems are not 
available in patient rooms. Smaller portable filtering units may be developed 
for use in ambulances which transport infectious persons. Portable filtering 
units are currently available for laboratory use where harmful fumes are vented 
across the appropriate filter. Advantages to this device would include a 
decrease of the concentration in the patient rooms, limited expense and 
portability. Only after clinical testing would devices of this nature be utilized 
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as a substitute or interim measure when utilized for TB areas. 
6. OSHA should develop regulations to enforce tuberculosis control 
measures similar to those developed for bloodborne 
pathogens. 
The current enforcement policies in the area of TB exposure are tenuous at 
best. Utilizing regulations and standards which are primarily related to 
industrial settings, the correlation to healthcare use is at times distant. 
Although several outbreaks of TB have occurred among health care workers and 
been investigated, OSHA has yet to levy any fines. With regulations specifically 
designed to protect the health care worker, enforcement may be more readily 
executed. Many questions still remain unanswered as to the effectiveness of the 
current technology and only after examination of the actual data resulting from 
clinical research may the regulations be developed. Areas which should be 
regulated by code include the administrative policies, PPE and engineering 
controls as previously discussed in this thesis. 
7. The financial means to establish funding of these research projects 
and the execution of the exposure control plans including the 
capital improvements required must be developed. 
The difficulty in providing the funding and implementing occupational safety 
programs in health care is as difficult in the health care industry as in general 
industry. The required isolation areas equipped with special ventilation systems 
are expensive to design, construct and maintain. Although most hospitals 
currently possess isolation areas, an increased volume of patients will require the 
construction of additional units. The provision of respiratory protection 
99 
equipment, PPD testing and medical surveillance are all expenses which must 
be recouped. Such costs will typically be passed onto the patients occupying 
these rooms through normal billing procedures. However, the great majority of 
these patients often will not have health insurance as they belong to lower socio-
economic status, the expense then remains uncollected and is borne by the 
hospital or other patients. Will the health care industry find alternative funding 
for these programs and capital improvements? Should special centers be 
established which receive federal funding to provide the proper facilities for TB 
patients? The Federal government must once again show resolve in the 
elimination of TB and provide the necessary financial backing within the 
proposed health care reform act to adequately treat the afflicted patients and 
protect the health care worker. 
The cooperation of all those involved with the exposure control plan is 
necessary to allow the desired effect to be achieved. The belief that some may 
have nothing to fear from acquiring TB is a false assumption. MRTB is 
particularly stubborn to cure and especially lethal for those who have a 
depressed immunosuppressant system. If TB were as lethal as HIV, would this 
complacency exist? Would questions still remain unanswered as to the actual 
risk and effectiveness of current exposure control measures? A hard lesson was 
learned when HIV infections began to spread among the general population. 
We cannot permit the same complacency to allow TB again to spread as a result 
of similar misunderstandings and lack of concern. 
APPENDIX A 
******************************************************************* 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
******************************************************************* 
Part Number 	 1910 
Standard Number 1910.134 
Title 	 Respiratory protection. 
(a) Permissible practice. 
(1) In the control of those occupational diseases caused by breathing air 
contaminated with harmful dusts, fogs, fumes, mists, gases, smokes, sprays, or 
vapors, the primary objective shall be to prevent atmospheric contamination. 
This shall be accomplished as far as feasible by accepted engineering control 
measures (for example, enclosure or confinement of the operation, general and 
local ventilation, and substitution of less toxic materials). When effective 
engineering controls are not feasible, or while they are being instituted, 
appropriate respirators shall be used pursuant to the following requirements. 
(2) Respirators shall be provided by the employer when such equipment is 
necessary to protect the health of the employee. The employer shall provide the 
respirators which are applicable and suitable for the purpose intended. The 
employer shall be responsible for the establishment and maintenance of a 
respiratory protective program which shall include the 
requirements outlined in paragraph (b) of this section. 
(3) The employee shall use the provided respiratory protection in accordance 
with instructions and training received. 
(b) Requirements for a minimal acceptable program. 
(1) Written standard operating procedures governing the selection and use of 
respirators shall be established. 
(2) Respirators shall be selected on the basis of hazards to which the worker 
is exposed. 
(3) The user shall be instructed and trained in the proper use of respirators 
and their limitations. 
(4) [Reserved] 
(5) Respirators shall be regularly cleaned and disinfected. Those used by more 
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than one worker shall be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected after each use. 
(6) Respirators shall be stored in a convenient, clean, and sanitary location. 
(7) Respirators used routinely shall be inspected during cleaning. Worn or 
deteriorated parts shall be replaced. Respirators for emergency use such as 
self-contained devices shall be thoroughly inspected at least once a month and 
after each use. 
(8) Appropriate surveillance of work area conditions and degree of employee 
exposure or stress shall be maintained. 
(9) There shall be regular inspection and evaluation to determine the 
continued effectiveness of the program. 
(10) Persons should not be assigned to tasks requiring use of respirators unless 
it has been determined that they are physically able to perform the work and 
use the equipment. The local physician shall determine what health and physical 
conditions are pertinent. The respirator user's medical status should be reviewed 
periodically (for instance, annually). 
(11) Approved or accepted respirators shall be used when they are available. 
The respirator furnished shall provide adequate respiratory protection against 
the particular hazard for which it is designed in accordance with standards 
established by competent authorities. The U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau 
of Mines, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture are recognized as such 
authorities. Although respirators listed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
continue to be acceptable for protection against specified pesticides, the U.S. 
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, is the agency now responsible for 
testing and 
approving pesticide respirators. 
(c) Selection of respirators. Proper selection of respirators shall be made 
according to the guidance of American National Standard Practices for 
Respiratory Protection Z88.2-1969. 
(d) Air quality. 
(1) Compressed air, compressed oxygen, liquid air, and liquid oxygen used for 
respiration shall be of high purity. Oxygen shall meet the requirements of the 
United States Pharmacopoeia for medical or breathing oxygen. Breathing air 
shall meet at least the requirements of the specification for Grade D breathing 
air as described in Compressed Gas 
Association Commodity Specification G-7.1-1966. Compressed oxygen shall not 
be used in supplied-air respirators or in open circuit self-contained breathing 
apparatus that have previously used compressed air. Oxygen must never be used 
with air line respirators. 
(2) Breathing air may be supplied to respirators from cylinders or air 
compressors. 
(i) Cylinders shall be tested and maintained as prescribed in the Shipping 
Container Specification Regulations of the Department of Transportation (49 
CFR Part 178). 
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(ii) The compressor for supplying air shall be equipped with necessary safety 
and standby devices. A breathing air-type compressor shall be used. 
Compressors shall be constructed and situated so as to avoid entry of 
contaminated air into the system and suitable in-line air purifying sorbent beds 
and filters installed to further assure breathing air quality. A receiver of 
sufficient capacity to enable the respirator wearer to escape from a 
contaminated atmosphere in event of compressor failure, and alarms to indicate 
compressor failure and overheating shall be installed in the system. If an 
oil-lubricated compressor is used, it shall 
have a high-temperature or carbon monoxide alarm, or both. If only a 
high-temperature alarm is used, the air from the compressor shall be frequently 
tested for carbon monoxide to insure that it meets the specifications in 
paragraph (d)(1) of this section. 
(3) Air line couplings shall be incompatible with outlets for other gas systems 
to prevent inadvertent servicing of air line respirators with nonrespirable gases 
or oxygen. 
(4) Breathing gas containers shall be marked in accordance with American 
National Standard Method of Marking Portable Compressed Gas Containers to 
Identify the Material Contained, Z48.1-1954; Federal Specification BB-A-1034a, 
June 21, 1968, Air, Compressed for Breathing Purposes; or Interim Federal 
Specification GG-B-00675b, April 27, 1965, Breathing Apparatus, 
Self-Contained. 
(e) Use of respirators. 
(1) Standard procedures shall be developed for respirator use. These should 
include all information and guidance necessary for their proper selection, use, 
and care. Possible emergency and routine uses of respirators should be 
anticipated and planned for. 
(2) The correct respirator shall be specified for each job. The respirator type 
is usually specified in the work procedures by a qualified individual supervising 
the respiratory protective program. The individual issuing them shall be 
adequately instructed to insure that the correct respirator is issued. 
(3) Written procedures shall be prepared covering safe use of respirators in 
dangerous atmospheres that might be encountered in normal operations or in 
emergencies. Personnel shall be familiar with these procedures and the available 
respirators. 
(i) In areas where the wearer, with failure of the respirator, could be overcome 
by a toxic or oxygen-deficient atmosphere, at least one additional man shall be 
present. Communications (visual, voice, or signal line) shall be maintained 
between both or all individuals present. Planning shall be such that one 
individual will be unaffected by any 
likely incident and have the proper rescue equipment to be able to assist the 
other(s) in case of emergency. 
(ii) When self-contained breathing apparatus or hose masks with blowers are 
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used in atmospheres immediately dangerous to life or health, standby men must 
be present with suitable rescue equipment. 
(iii) Persons using air line respirators in atmospheres immediately hazardous 
to life or health shall be equipped with safety harnesses and safety lines for 
lifting or removing persons from hazardous atmospheres or other and equivalent 
provisions for the rescue of persons from hazardous atmospheres shall be used. 
A standby man or men with suitable 
self-contained breathing apparatus shall be at the nearest fresh air base for 
emergency rescue. 
(4) Respiratory protection is no better than the respirator in use, even though 
it is worn conscientiously. Frequent random inspections shall be conducted by 
a qualified individual to assure that respirators are properly selected, used, 
cleaned, and maintained. 
(5) For safe use of any respirator, it is essential that the user be properly 
instructed in its selection, use, and maintenance. Both supervisors and workers 
shall be so instructed by competent persons. Training shall provide the men an 
opportunity to handle the respirator, 
have it fitted properly, test its face-piece-to-face seal, wear it in normal air for 
a long familiarity period, and, finally, to wear it in a test atmosphere. 
(i) Every respirator wearer shall receive fitting instructions including 
demonstrations and practice in how the respirator should be worn, how to adjust 
it, and how to determine if it fits properly. Respirators shall not be worn when 
conditions prevent a good face seal. Such conditions may be a growth of beard, 
sideburns, a skull cap that projects under the facepiece, 
or temple pieces on glasses. Also, the absence of one or both dentures can 
seriously affect the fit of a facepiece. The worker's diligence in observing these 
factors shall be evaluated by periodic check. To assure proper protection, the 
facepiece fit shall be checked by the wearer each time he puts on the respirator. 
This may be done by following the manufacturer's facepiece fitting instructions. 
(ii) Providing respiratory protection for individuals wearing corrective glasses 
is a serious problem. A proper seal cannot be established if the temple bars of 
eye glasses extend through the sealing edge of the full facepiece. As a temporary 
measure, glasses with short temple bars or without temple bars may be taped to 
the wearer's head. Wearing of contact lenses in contaminated atmospheres with 
a respirator shall not be allowed. Systems have been developed for mounting 
corrective lenses inside full facepieces. When a workman must wear corrective 
lenses as part of the facepiece, the facepiece and lenses shall be fitted by 
qualified individuals to provide good vision, comfort, and a gas-tight seal. 
(iii) If corrective spectacles or goggles are required, they shall be worn so as 
not to affect the fit of the facepiece. Proper selection of equipment will 
minimize or avoid this problem. 
(f) Maintenance and care of respirators. 
(1) A program for maintenance and care of respirators shall be adjusted to the 
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type of plant, working conditions, and hazards involved, and shall include the 
following basic services: 
(i) Inspection for defects (including a leak check), 
(ii) Cleaning and disinfecting, 
(iii) Repair, 
(iv) Storage 
Equipment shall be properly maintained to retain its original effectiveness. 
(2) (i) All respirators shall be inspected routinely before and after each use. 
A respirator that is not routinely used but is kept ready for emergency use shall 
be inspected after each use and at least monthly to assure that it is in 
satisfactory working condition. 
(ii) Self-contained breathing apparatus shall be inspected monthly. Air and 
oxygen cylinders shall be fully charged according to the manufacturer's 
instructions. It shall be determined that the regulator and warning devices 
function properly. 
(iii) Respirator inspection shall include a check of the tightness of connections 
and the condition of the facepiece, headbands, valves, connecting tube, and 
canisters. Rubber or elastomer parts shall be inspected for pliability and signs 
of deterioration. Stretching and 
manipulating rubber or elastomer parts with a massaging action will keep them 
pliable and flexible and prevent them from taking a set during storage. 
(iv) A record shall be kept of inspection dates and findings for respirators 
maintained for emergency use. 
(3) Routinely used respirators shall be collected, cleaned, and disinfected as 
frequently as necessary to insure that proper protection is provided for the 
wearer. Respirators maintained for emergency use shall be cleaned and 
disinfected after each use. 
(4) Replacement or repairs shall be done only by experienced persons with 
parts designed for the respirator. No attempt shall be made to replace 
components or to make adjustment or repairs beyond the manufacturer's 
recommendations. Reducing or admission valves or regulators shall be returned 
to the manufacturer or to a trained technician for 
adjustment or repair. 
(5) (i) After inspection, cleaning, and necessary repair, respirators shall be 
stored to protect against dust, sunlight, heat, extreme cold, excessive moisture, 
or damaging chemicals. Respirators placed at stations and work areas for 
emergency use should be quickly accessible at all times and should be stored in 
compartments built for the purpose. The 
compartments should be clearly marked. Routinely used respirators, such as dust 
respirators, may be placed in plastic bags. Respirators should not be stored in 
such places as lockers or tool boxes unless they are in carrying cases or cartons. 
(ii) Respirators should be packed or stored so that the facepiece and 
exhalation valve will rest in a normal position and function will not be impaired 
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by the elastomer setting in an abnormal position. 
(iii) Instructions for proper storage of emergency respirators, such as gas 
masks and self-contained breathing apparatus, are found in "use and care" 
instructions usually mounted inside the carrying case lid. 
(g) Identification of gas mask canisters. 
(1) The primary means of identifying a gas mask canister shall be by means of 
properly worded labels. The secondary means of identifying a gas mask canister 
shall be by a color code. 
(2) All who issue or use gas masks falling within the scope of this section shall 
see that all gas mask canisters purchased or used by them are properly labeled 
and colored in accordance with these requirements before they are placed in 
service and that the labels and colors are properly maintained at all times 
thereafter until the canisters have completely served their purpose. 
(3) On each canister shall appear in bold letters the following: 
(i) - 
Canister for 	 (Name for atmospheric contaminant) 
or 
Type N Gas Mask Canister 
(ii) In addition, essentially the following wording shall appear beneath the 
appropriate phrase on the canister label: "For respiratory protection in 
atmospheres containing not more than 	  percent by volume of 
	 ." (Name of atmospheric contaminant) 
(4) Canisters having a special high-efficiency filter for protection against radio 
nuclide and other highly toxic particulate shall be labeled with a statement of 
the type and degree of protection afforded by the filter. The label shall be 
affixed to the neck end of, or to the gray 
stripe which is around and near the top of, the canister. The degree of 
protection shall be marked as the percent of penetration of the canister by a 
0.3-micron-diameter dioctyl phthalate (DOP) smoke at a flow rate of 85 liters 
per minute. 
(5) Each canister shall have a label warning that gas masks should be used 
only in atmospheres containing sufficient oxygen to support life (at least 16 
percent by volume), since gas mask canisters are only designed to neutralize or 
remove contaminants from the air. 
(6) Each gas mask canister shall be painted a distinctive color or combination 
of colors indicated in Table I-1. All colors used shall be such that they are 
clearly identifiable by the user and clearly distinguishable from one another. The 
color coating used shall offer a 
high degree of resistance to chipping, scaling, peeling, blistering, fading, and the 
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effects of the ordinary atmospheres to which they may be exposed under normal 
conditions of storage and use. Appropriately colored pressure sensitive tape may 
be used for the stripes. 
TABLE I-1 
Atmospheric contaminants 
	
Colors assigned(1) 
to be protected against 
Acid gases White. 
Hydrocyanic acid gas White with 1/2-inch green stripe 
completely around the canister 
near the bottom. 
Chlorine gas White with 1/2-inch yellow stripe 
completely around the canister 
near the bottom. 
Organic vapors Black. 
Ammonia gas Green. 
Acid gases and ammonia gases Green with 1/2-inch white stripe 
completely around the canister 
near the bottom. 
Carbon Monoxide Blue. 
Acid gases and organic vapors Yellow. 
Hydrocyanic acid gas and chloropicrin Yellow with 1/2-inch blue stripe 
vapor completely around the canister 
near the bottom. 
Acid gases, organic vapors, and ammonia 
gases Brown. 
Radioactive materials, excepting 
tritium and noble gases Purple (Magenta). 
Particulate (dusts, fumes, mists, 
fogs, or smokes) in combination with 
Canister color for contaminant,as 
designated above, with 1/2-inch 
any of the above gases or vapors gray stripe completely around the 
canister near the top. 
All of the above atmospheric Red with 1/2-inch gray stripe 
contaminants completely around the canister 
near the top. 
Footnote(1) Gray shall not be assigned as a main color for a canister designed 
to remove acids or vapors. 
NOTE: Orange shall be used as a complete body, or stripe color to represent 
gases not included in this table. The user will need to refer to the canister label 
to determine the degree of protection the canister will afford. 
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(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 
1218-0099) 
[39 FR 23502, June 27, 1974, as amended at 43 FR 49748, Oct. 24, 1978; 49 FR 
5322, Feb. 10, 1984; 49 FR 18295, Apr. 30, 1984] 
APPENDIX B 
******************************************************************* 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
******************************************************************* 
Part Number 	 1915 
Standard Number 1915.152 
Title 	 Respiratory protection. 
(a) General. 
(1) All respiratory equipment required by this Part shall be approved for the 
use for which it is intended by the Mine Safety and Health Administration and 
the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health pursuant to the 
provisions of 30 CFR Part 11. Respiratory protective equipment shall be used 
only for the purpose intended and no modifications of the equipment shall be 
made. 
(2) Respiratory protective equipment shall be inspected regulatory and 
maintained in good condition. Gas mask canisters and chemical cartridges shall 
be replaced as necessary so as to provide complete protection. Mechanical filters 
shall be cleaned or replaced as necessary so as to avoid undue resistance to 
breathing. 
(3) Respiratory protective equipment which has been previously used shall be 
cleaned and disinfected before it is issued by the employer to another employee. 
Emergency rescue equipment shall be cleaned and disinfected immediately after 
each use. 
(4) Employees required to use respiratory protective equipment approved for 
use in atmospheres immediately dangerous to life shall be thoroughly trained in 
its use. Employees required to use other types of respiratory protective 
equipment shall be instructed in the use and limitations of such equipment. 
1915.152(a)(5) 
(5) When an air line respirator is used, the air line shall be fitted with a 
pressure regulating valve and a filter which will remove oil water and rust 
particles. The air intake shall be from a source which is free from all 
contaminants, such as the exhaust from internal combustion engines. 
(6) In all cases when an employee is stationed outside a compartment, tank or 
space as a tender or safety man for men working inside in an atmosphere 
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immediately dangerous to life, the tender shall have immediately available for 
emergency use respiratory protective equipment equivalent to that required for 
the men in the compartment. When a tender is stationed outside a compartment 
for men working inside in an atmosphere not immediately dangerous to life, the 
tender shall wear respiratory protective equipment equivalent to that required 
for the men in the compartment if he is exposed for prolonged periods to the 
same concentration of atmospheric contaminants. 
(b) Protection in atmospheres immediately dangerous to life. 
(1) Atmospheres immediately dangerous to life are those which contain less 
than 16.5 percent oxygen, or which by reason of the high toxicity of the 
contaminant, as in fumigation, or high concentration of the contaminant, as with 
carbon dioxide, would endanger the life of a person breathing them for even a 
short period of time. 
(2) In atmospheres immediately dangerous to life the only approved types of 
respiratory protective equipment are the following: 
(i) Self-contained breathing apparatus, in which the wearer carries with him 
a supply of oxygen, air, or an oxygen generating material. 
(ii) Hose mask with blower, in which a hand or motor operated blower 
supplies air at high volume and low pressure through a large diameter hose 
through which the wearer can draw air in case the blower fails. 
(iii) If there is known to be more than 16 percent oxygen and less than 2 
percent gas by volume, a gas mask equipped with a canister approved for the 
particular type gas involved. 
Note: A gas mask offers absolutely no protection in an atmosphere deficient 
in oxygen. 
(3) Work in atmospheres immediately dangerous to life shall be performed 
only in an emergency, as when rescuing a man who has been overcome or when 
shutting off a source of contamination that cannot otherwise be controlled. 
When an employee enters such an atmosphere he shall be provided with and 
use an adequate, attended life line. 
(4) In the vicinity of each vessel in which there is a danger of employees being 
exposed to an atmosphere immediately dangerous to life, the employer shall 
have on hand and ready for use respiratory protective equipment approved for 
such use. When such equipment is required, one or more persons shall be 
thoroughly trained in the use of the equipment. 
(c) Protection against gaseous contaminants not immediately dangerous to life. 
(1) Gaseous contaminants not immediately dangerous to life are gases present 
in concentrations that could be breathed for a short period without endangering 
the life of a person breathing them, but which might produce discomfort and 
possible injury after a prolonged single exposure or repeated short exposures. 
(2) When employees are exposed to a gaseous contaminated atmosphere not 
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immediately dangerous to life, they shall be protected by respiratory protective 
equipment approved for use in the type and concentration of the gaseous 
contaminant as follows: 
(i) In high or unknown concentrations, a hose mask or an air line respirator. 
The use of either a hose mask or an air line respirator in lower concentrations 
is permissible. 
(ii) In concentrations of ammonia of less than 3 percent, or of other gases less 
than 2 percent, by volume, a canister type gas mask equipped with the proper 
type of canister. Different canisters are approved for specific use against the 
following gases or groups of gases: Acid gases, hydrocyanic acid gas, chlorine 
gas, organic vapors, ammonia gas, carbon monoxide, or combination of the 
above. 
(iii) In low concentrations (less than 0.1 percent by volume), a chemical 
cartridge respirator equipped with the type of cartridge approved for use against 
the particular gases or groups of gases listed in paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this 
section. 
(d) Protection against particulate contaminants not immediately dangerous to 
life. 
(1) When employees are exposed to unsafe concentrations of particular 
contaminants, such as dusts and fumes, mists and fogs or combinations of solids 
and liquids, they shall be protected by either air line or filter respirators, except 
as otherwise provided in this part. 
(2) Filter respirators shall be equipped with the proper type of filter. Different 
filters are approved for specific protection against groups of contaminants, as 
follows: 
(i) Pneumoconiosis-producing dust and nuisance dust filters which provide 
respiratory protection against pneumoconiosis-producing dusts,such as 
aluminum, cellulose, cement, charcoal, coal, coke, flour, gypsum, iron ore, 
limestone and wood. 
(ii) Toxic dust filters which provide respiratory protection against toxic dusts 
that are not significantly more toxic than lead, such as arsenic, cadmium, 
chromium, lead, manganese, selenium, vanadium, and their compounds. 
(iii) Mist filters which provide respiratory protection against 
pneumoconiosis-producting mists, chromic acid mists, and nuisance mists. 
(iv) Fume filters which provide respiratory protection against fumes (solid 
dispersoids or particulate matter formed by the condensation of vapors, such as 
those from heated metals and other substances). 
(v) Filters which provide respiratory protection against combinations of two or 
more of the contaminants described in paragraphs (d)(2) (i) through (iv) of this 
section. 
(e) Protection against combinations of gaseous and particulate contaminants 
not immediately dangerous to life. 
(1) When employees are exposed to combinations of gaseous and particulate 
111 
contaminants not immediately dangerous to life, as in spray painting they shall 
be protected by respiratory protective equipment approved for use in the type 
and concentration of the contaminants, as follows: 
(i) In high or unknown concentrations, a hose mask or an air line respirator. 
The use of either a hose mask or an air line respirator is permissible in lower 
concentrations. 
(ii) In concentrations of gaseous contaminants of less than 2 percent by 
volume, a canister type gas mask with a combination canister approved for the 
particular type of gaseous contaminant as specified in paragraph (c)(2) of this 
section and a filter for the particular type of particulate contaminant as specified 
in paragraph (d)(1) of this section. 
(iii) In low concentrations of gaseous contaminants (less than 0.1 percent by 
volume) a respirator equipped with the type of cartridge and filter as specified 
in paragraph (e)(ii) of this section. 
APPENDIX C 
******************************************************************* 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
******************************************************************* 
Part Number 
	
1910 
Standard Number 1910.1030 
Title Bloodborne pathogens. 
* [Effective date for this standard, 1910.1030, is Mar. 6, 1992] Authority: Secs. 
6 and 8, Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C.655, 657, Secretary of 
Labor's Orders Nos. 12-71 (36 FR 8754), 8-76 (41FR 25059), or 9-83 (48 FR 
35736), as applicable; and 29 CFR Part 1911. Section 1910.1030 also issued 
under 29 U.S.C. 653. 
(a) Scope and Application. This section applies to all occupational exposure 
to blood or other potentially infectious materials as defined by paragraph (b) of 
this section. 
(b) Definitions. For purposes of this section, the following shall 
apply:"Assistant Secretary" means the Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
Occupational Safety and Health, or designated representative. 
"Blood" means human blood, human blood components, and products made 
from human blood. 
"Bloodborne Pathogens" means pathogenic microorganisms that are present in 
human blood and can cause disease in humans. These pathogens include,but are 
not limited to, hepatitis B virus (HBV) and humanimmunodeficiency virus 
(HIV). 
"Clinical Laboratory" means a workplace where diagnostic or other screening 
procedures are performed on blood or other potentially infectious materials. 
"Contaminated" means the presence or the reasonably anticipated presence of 
blood or other potentially infectious materials on an item or surface. 
"Contaminated Laundry" means laundry which has been soiled with blood or 
other potentially infectious materials or may contain sharps. 
"Contaminated Sharps" means any contaminated object that can penetrate the 
skin including, but not limited to, needles, scalpels, broken glass,broken capillary 
tubes, and exposed ends of dental wires. 
"Decontamination" means the use of physical or chemical means to 
remove,inactivate, or destroy bloodborne pathogens on a surface or item to the 
point where they are no longer capable of transmitting infectious particles and 
the surface or item is rendered safe for handling, use, or disposal. 
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"Director" means the Director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, or designated 
representative. 
"Engineering Controls" means controls (e.g., sharps disposal 
containers,self-sheathing needles) that isolate or remove the bloodborne 
pathogens hazard from the workplace. 
"Exposure Incident" means a specific eye, mouth, other mucous 
membrane,non-intact skin, or parenteral contact with blood or other potentially 
infectious materials that results from the performance of an employee'sduties. 
"Handwashing Facilities" means a facility providing an adequate supply of 
running potable water, soap and single use towels or hot air drying machines. 
"Licensed Healthcare Professional" is a person whose legally permitted scope 
of practice allows him or her to independently perform the activities required 
by paragraph (f) Hepatitis B Vaccination and Post-exposure Evaluation and 
Follow-up. 
"HBV" means hepatitis B virus. 
"HIV" means human immunodeficiency virus. 
"Occupational Exposure" means reasonably anticipated skin, eye, 
mucousmembrane, or parenteral contact with blood or other potentially 
infectious materials that may result from the performance of an employee's 
duties. 
"Other Potentially Infectious Materials" means (1) The following human body 
fluids: semen, vaginal secretions, cerebrospinal fluid, synovial fluid, pleural fluid, 
pericardial fluid, peritoneal fluid, amniotic fluid, saliva in dental procedures, 
any body fluid that is visibly contaminated with blood, and all body fluids in 
situations where it is difficult or impossible to differentiate between body fluids; 
(2) Anyun fixed tissue or organ (other than intact skin) from a human (living 
or dead); and (3) HIV-containing cell or tissue cultures, organ cultures,and 
HIV- or HBV-containing culture medium or other solutions; and blood,organs, 
or other tissues from experimental animals infected with HIV or HBV. 
"Parenteral" means piercing mucous membranes or the skin barrier through 
such events as needle sticks, human bites, cuts, and abrasions. 
"Personal Protective Equipment" is specialized clothing or equipment worn by 
an employee for protection against a hazard. General work clothes(e.g., 
uniforms, pants, shirts or blouses) not intended to function as protection against 
a hazard are not considered to be personal protective equipment. 
"Production Facility" means a facility engaged in industrial-scale,large-volume 
or high concentration production of HIV or HBV. 
"Regulated Waste" means liquid or semi-liquid blood or other potentially 
infectious materials; contaminated items that would release blood or other 
potentially infectious materials in a liquid or semi-liquid state if compressed; 
items that are caked with dried blood or other potentially infectious materials 
and are capable of releasing these materials during handling; contaminated 
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sharps; and pathological and microbiological wastes containing blood or other 
potentially infectious materials. 
"Research Laboratory" means a laboratory producing or using 
research-laboratory-scale amounts of HIV or HBV. Research laboratories may 
produce high concentrations of HIV or HBV but not in the volume found in 
production facilities. 
"Source Individual" means any individual, living or dead, whose blood or other 
potentially infectious materials may be a source of occupational exposure to the 
employee. Examples include, but are not limited to,hospital and clinic patients; 
clients in institutions for the developmentally disabled; trauma victims; clients 
of drug and alcohol treatment facilities; residents of hospices and nursing 
homes; human remains; and individuals who donate or sell blood or blood 
components. 
"Sterilize" means the use of a physical or chemical procedure to destroy all 
microbial life including highly resistant bacterial endospore. 
"Universal Precautions" is an approach to infection control. According to the 
concept of Universal Precautions, all human blood and certain human body 
fluids are treated as if known to be infectious for HIV, HBV, and other 
bloodborne pathogens. 
"Work Practice Controls" means controls that reduce the likelihood of 
exposure by altering the manner in which a task is performed (e.g.,prohibiting 
recapping of needles by a two-handed technique). 
(c) Exposure Control. 
(1) Exposure Control Plan. 
(i) Each employer having an employee(s) with occupational exposure as 
defined by paragraph (b) of this section shall establish a written Exposure 
Control Plan designed to eliminate or minimize employee exposure. 
(ii) The Exposure Control Plan shall contain at least the following elements: 
(A) The exposure determination required by paragraph (c)(2), 
(B) The schedule and method of implementation for paragraphs (d)Methods 
of Compliance, (e) HIV and HBV Research Laboratories and Production 
Facilities, (f) Hepatitis B Vaccination and Post-Exposure Evaluation and 
Follow-up, (g) Communication of Hazards to Employees, and(h) Record 
keeping, of this standard, and (C) The procedure for the evaluation of 
circumstances surrounding exposure incidents as required by paragraph (f)(3)(i) 
of this standard. 
(iii) Each employer shall ensure that a copy of the Exposure Control Plan is 
accessible to employees in accordance with 29 CFR 1910.20(e). 
(iv) The Exposure Control Plan shall be reviewed and updated at least 
annually and whenever necessary to reflect new or modified tasks and 
procedures which affect occupational exposure and to reflect new or revised 
employee positions with occupational exposure. 
(v) The Exposure Control Plan shall be made available to the Assistant 
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Secretary and the Director upon request for examination and copying. 
(2) Exposure Determination. 
(i) Each employer who has an employee(s)with occupational exposure as 
defined by paragraph 
(b) of this section shall prepare an exposure determination. This exposure 
determination shall contain the following: 
(A) A list of all job classifications in which all employees in those job 
classifications have occupational exposure; 
(B) A list of job classifications in which some employees have occupational 
exposure, and 	 (C) A list of all tasks and procedures or groups of closely 
related task and procedures in which occupational exposure occurs and that are 
performed by employees in job classifications listed in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph (c)(2)(i)(B) of this standard. 
(ii) This exposure determination shall be made without regard to the use of 
personal protective equipment. 
(d) Methods of Compliance. 
(1) General. Universal precautions shall be observed to prevent contact with 
blood or other potentially infectious materials. Under circumstances in which 
differentiation between body fluid types is difficult or impossible, all body fluids 
shall be considered potentially infectious materials. 
(2) Engineering and Work Practice Controls. 
(i) Engineering and work practice controls shall be used to eliminate or 
minimize employee exposure. Where occupational exposure remains after 
institution of these controls, personal protective equipment shall also be used. 
(ii) Engineering controls shall be examined and maintained or replace don a 
regular schedule to ensure their effectiveness. 
(iii) Employers shall provide handwashing facilities which are readily accessible 
to employees. 
(iv) When provision of handwashing facilities is not feasible, the employer shall 
provide either an appropriate antiseptic hand cleanser in conjunction with clean 
cloth/paper towels or antiseptic towelettes. When antiseptic hand cleansers or 
towelettes are used, hands shall be washed with soap and running water as soon 
as feasible. 
(v) Employers shall ensure that employees wash their hands immediately or as 
soon as feasible after removal of gloves or other personal protective equipment. 
(vi) Employers shall ensure that employees wash hands and any other skin with 
soap and water, or flush mucous membranes with water immediately or as soon 
as feasible following contact of such body areas with blood or other potentially 
infectious materials. 
(vii) Contaminated needles and other contaminated sharps shall not be bent, 
recapped, or removed except as noted in paragraphs (d)(2)(vii)(A)and 
(d)(2)(vii)(B) below. Shearing or breaking of contaminated needles is prohibited. 
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(A) Contaminated needles and other contaminated sharps shall not be 
recapped or removed unless the employer can demonstrate that no alternative 
is feasible or that such action is required by a specific medical procedure. 
(B) Such recapping or needle removal must be accomplished through the use 
of a mechanical device or a one-handed technique. 
(viii) Immediately or as soon as possible after use, contaminated reusable 
sharps shall be placed in appropriate containers until properly reprocessed. 
These containers shall be: 
(A) puncture resistant; 
(B) labeled or color-coded in accordance with this standard; 
(C) leak proof on the sides and bottom; and 
(D) in accordance with the requirements set forth in paragraph (d)(4)(ii)(E) 
for reusable sharps. 
(ix) Eating, drinking, smoking, applying cosmetics or lip balm, and handling 
contact lenses are prohibited in work areas where there is a reasonable 
likelihood of occupational exposure. 
(x) Food and drink shall not be kept in refrigerators, freezers,shelves, cabinets 
or on counter tops or bench tops where blood or other potentially infectious 
materials are present. (xi) All procedures involving blood or other potentially 
infectious materials shall be performed in such a manner as to minimize 
splashing,spraying, spattering, and generation of droplets of these substances. 
(xii) Mouth pipetting/suctioning of blood or other potentially infectious 
materials is prohibited. 
(xiii) Specimens of blood or other potentially infectious materials shall be 
placed in a container which prevents leakage during collection,handling, 
processing, storage, transport, or shipping. 
(A) The container for storage, transport, or shipping shall be labeled or 
color-coded according to paragraph (g)(1)(i) and closed prior to being stored, 
transported, or shipped. When a facility utilizes Universal Precautions in the 
handling of all specimens, the labeling/color-coding of specimens is not 
necessary provided containers are recognizable as containing specimens. This 
exemption only applies while such specimens/containers remain within the 
facility. Labeling or color-coding in accordance with paragraph (g)(1)(i) is 
required when such specimens/containers leave the facility. 
(B) If outside contamination of the primary container occurs, the primary 
container shall be placed within a second container which prevents leakage 
during handling, processing, storage, transport, or shipping and is labeled or 
color-coded according to the requirements of this standard. 
(C) If the specimen could puncture the primary container, the primary 
container shall be placed within a secondary container which is 
puncture-resistant in addition to the above characteristics. 
(xiv) Equipment which may become contaminated with blood or other 
potentially infectious materials shall be examined prior to servicing or shipping 
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and shall be decontaminated as necessary, unless the employer can demonstrate 
that decontamination of such equipment or portions of such equipment is not 
feasible. 
(A) A readily observable label in accordance with paragraph(g)(1)(i)(H) shall 
be attached to the equipment stating which portions remain contaminated. 
(B) The employer shall ensure that this information is conveyed to all affected 
employees, the servicing representative, and/or the manufacturer, as appropriate, 
prior to handling, servicing, or shipping so that appropriate precautions will be 
taken. 
(3) Personal Protective Equipment. 
(i) Provision. When there is occupational exposure, the employer shall provide, 
at no cost to the employee, appropriate personal protective equipment such as, 
but not limited to, gloves, gowns, laboratory coats, face shields or masks and eye 
protection, and mouthpieces, resuscitation bags, pocket masks, or other 
ventilation devices. Personal protective equipment will be considered 
"appropriate" only if it does not permit blood or other potentially infectious 
materials to pass through to or reach the employee's work clothes, street clothes, 
undergarments, skin, eyes,mouth, or other mucous membranes under normal 
conditions of use and for the duration of time which the protective equipment 
will be used. 
(ii) Use. The employer shall ensure that the employee uses appropriate 
personal protective equipment unless the employer shows that the employee 
temporarily and briefly declined to use personal protective equipment when, 
under rare and extraordinary circumstances, it was the employee's professional 
judgment that in the specific instance its use would have prevented the delivery 
of health care or public safety services or would have posed an increased hazard 
to the safety of the worker or co-worker.When the employee makes this 
judgement, the circumstances shall be investigated and documented in order to 
determine whether changes can be instituted to prevent such occurrences in the 
future. 
(iii) Accessibility. The employer shall ensure that appropriate personal 
protective equipment in the appropriate sizes is readily accessible at the work 
site or is issued to employees. Hypoallergenic gloves, glove liners, powderless 
gloves, or other similar alternatives shall be readily accessible to those 
employees who are allergic to the gloves normally provided. 
(iv) Cleaning, Laundering, and Disposal. The employer shall clean,launder, and 
dispose of personal protective equipment required by paragraphs (d) and (e) of 
this standard, at no cost to the employee. 
(v) Repair and Replacement. The employer shall repair or replace personal 
protective equipment as needed to maintain its effectiveness, at no cost to the 
employee. 
(vi) If a garment(s) is penetrated by blood or other potentially infectious 
materials, the garment(s) shall be removed immediately or as soon as feasible. 
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(vii) All personal protective equipment shall be removed prior to leaving the 
work area. 
	 (viii) When personal protective equipment is removed it shall be 
placed in an appropriately designated area or container for storage, 
washing,decontamination or disposal. 
(ix) Gloves. Gloves shall be worn when it can be reasonably anticipated that 
the employee may have hand contact with blood, other potentially infectious 
materials, mucous membranes, and non-intact skin; when performing vascular 
access procedures except as specified in paragraph(d)(3)(ix)(D); and when 
handling or touching contaminated items or surfaces. 
(A) Disposable (single use) gloves such as surgical or examination gloves, shall 
be replaced as soon as practical when contaminated or as soon as feasible if they 
are torn, punctured, or when their ability to function as a barrier is 
compromised. 
(B) Disposable (single use) gloves shall not be washed or decontaminated for 
re-use. 
(C) Utility gloves may be decontaminated for re-use if the integrity of the 
glove is not compromised. However, they must be discarded if they are cracked, 
peeling, torn, punctured, or exhibit other signs of deterioration or when their 
ability to function as a barrier is compromised. 
(D) If an employer in a volunteer blood donation center judges that routine 
gloving for all phlebotomies is not necessary then the employer shall: 
{1} Periodically reevaluate this policy; 
{2} Make gloves available to all employees who wish to use them for 
phlebotomy; 
{3} Not discourage the use of gloves for phlebotomy; and 
{4} Require that gloves be used for phlebotomy in the following 
circumstances: 
{i} When the employee has cuts, scratches, or other breaks in his or her skin; 
{ii} When the employee judges that hand contamination with blood may occur, 
for example, when performing phlebotomy on an uncooperative source 
individual; and 
{iii} When the employee is receiving training in phlebotomy. 
(x) Masks, Eye Protection, and Face Shields. Masks in combination with eye 
protection devices, such as goggles or glasses with solid side shields, or 
chin-length face shields, shall be worn whenever splashes,spray, spatter, or 
droplets of blood or other potentially infectious materials may be generated and 
eye, nose, or mouth contamination can be reasonably anticipated. 
(xi) Gowns, Aprons, and Other Protective Body Clothing. Appropriate 
protective clothing such as, but not limited to, gowns, aprons, lab coats, clinic 
jackets, or similar outer garments shall be worn in occupational exposure 
situations. The type and characteristics will depend upon the task and degree of 
exposure anticipated. 
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(xii) Surgical caps or hoods and/or shoe covers or boots shall be worn in 
instances when gross contamination can reasonably be anticipated(e.g., 
autopsies, orthopaedic surgery). 
(4) Housekeeping. 
(i) General. Employers shall ensure that the work site is maintained in a clean 
and sanitary condition. The employer shall determine and implement an 
appropriate written schedule for cleaning and method of decontamination based 
upon the location within the facility,type of surface to be cleaned, type of soil 
present, and tasks or procedures being performed in the area. 
(ii) All equipment and environmental and working surfaces shall be cleaned 
and decontaminated after contact with blood or other potentially infectious 
materials. 
(A) Contaminated work surfaces shall be decontaminated with an appropriate 
disinfectant after completion of procedures; immediately or as soon as feasible 
when surfaces are overtly contaminated or after any spill of blood or other 
potentially infectious materials; and at the end of the work shift if the surface 
may have become contaminated since the last cleaning. 
	
(B) Protective 
coverings, such as plastic wrap, aluminum foil, or imperviously-backed absorbent 
paper used to cover equipment and environmental surfaces, shall be removed 
and replaced as soon as feasible when they become overtly contaminated or at 
the end of the work shift if they may have become contaminated during the 
shift. 
(C) All bins, pails, cans, and similar receptacles intended for reuse which have 
a reasonable likelihood for becoming contaminated with blood or other 
potentially infectious materials shall be inspected and decontaminated on a 
regularly scheduled basis and cleaned and decontaminated immediately or as 
soon as feasible upon visible contamination. 
(D) Broken glassware which may be contaminated shall not be picked up 
directly with the hands. It shall be cleaned up using mechanical means,such as 
a brush and dust pan, tongs, or forceps. 
(E) Reusable sharps that are contaminated with blood or other potentially 
infectious materials shall not be stored or processed in a manner that requires 
employees to reach by hand into the containers where these sharps have been 
placed. 
(iii) Regulated Waste. 
(A) Contaminated Sharps Discarding and Containment. {1} Contaminated 
sharps shall be discarded immediately or as soon as feasible in containers that 
are: [a] Closable; [b] Puncture resistant; [c] Leak proof on sides and bottom; 
and [d] Labeled or color-coded in accordance with paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this 
standard. 
{2} During use, containers for contaminated sharps shall be: [a] Easily 
accessible to personnel and located as close as is feasible to the immediate area 
where sharps are used or can be reasonably anticipated to be found (e.g., 
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laundries); [b] Maintained upright throughout use; and [c] Replaced routinely 
and not be allowed to overfill. {3} When moving containers of contaminated 
sharps from the area of use,the containers shall be: [a] Closed immediately 
prior to removal or replacement to prevent spillage or protrusion of contents 
during handling, storage, transport,or shipping; [b] Placed in a secondary 
container if leakage is possible. The second container shall be: [i] Closable; 
[ii] Constructed to contain all contents and prevent leakage during handling, 
storage, transport, or shipping; and [iii] Labeled or color-coded according to 
paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this standard. {4} Reusable containers shall not be 
opened, emptied, or cleaned manually or in any other manner which would 
expose employees to the risk of percutaneous injury. 
(B) Other Regulated Waste Containment. {1} Regulated waste shall be 
placed in containers which are: [a] Closable; [b] Constructed to contain all 
contents and prevent leakage of fluids during handling, storage, transport or 
shipping; 	 [c] Labeled or color-coded in accordance with paragraph (g)(1)(i) 
this standard; and 	 [d] Closed prior to removal to prevent spillage or 
protrusion of contents during handling, storage, transport, or shipping. {2} If 
outside contamination of the regulated waste container occurs,it shall be placed 
in a second container. The second container shall be: 	 [a] Closable; 	 [b] 
Constructed to contain all contents and prevent leakage of fluids during 
handling, storage, transport or shipping; 
	
[c] Labeled or color-coded in 
accordance with paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this standard; and [d] Closed prior to 
removal to prevent spillage or protrusion of contents during handling, storage, 
transport, or shipping. 
(C) Disposal of all regulated waste shall be in accordance with applicable 
regulations of the United States, States and Territories, and political 
subdivisions of States and Territories. 
(iv) Laundry. 
(A) Contaminated laundry shall be handled as little as possible with a 
minimum of agitation. 
	 {1} Contaminated laundry shall be bagged or 
containerized at the location where it was used and shall not be sorted or rinsed 
in the location of use. {2} Contaminated laundry shall be placed and 
transported in bags or containers labeled or color-coded in accordance with 
paragraph (g)(1)(i)of this standard. When a facility utilizes Universal 
Precautions in the handling of all soiled laundry, alternative labeling or 
color-coding is sufficient if it permits all employees to recognize the containers 
as requiring compliance with Universal Precautions. 	 {3} Whenever 
contaminated laundry is wet and presents a reasonable likelihood of 
soak-through of or leakage from the bag or container, the laundry shall be 
placed and transported in bags or containers which prevent soak-through and/or 
leakage of fluids to the exterior. 
(B) The employer shall ensure that employees who have contact with 
contaminated laundry wear protective gloves and other appropriate personal 
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protective equipment. 
(C) When a facility ships contaminated laundry off-site to a second facility 
which does not utilize Universal Precautions in the handling of all laundry, the 
facility generating the contaminated laundry must place such laundry in bags or 
containers which are labeled or color-coded in accordance with paragraph 
(g)(1)(i). 
(e) HIV and HBV Research Laboratories and Production Facilities. 
(1) This paragraph applies to research laboratories and production facilities 
engaged in the culture, production, concentration,experimentation, and 
manipulation of HIV and HBV. It does not apply to clinical or diagnostic 
laboratories engaged solely in the analysis of blood, tissues, or organs. These 
requirements apply in addition to the other requirements of the standard. 
(2) Research laboratories and production facilities shall meet the following 
criteria: 
(i) Standard Microbiological Practices. All regulated waste shall either be 
incinerated or decontaminated by a method such as auto claving known to 
effectively destroy bloodborne pathogens. 
(ii) Special Practices 
(A) Laboratory doors shall be kept closed when work involving HIV or HBV 
is in progress. (B) Contaminated materials that are to be decontaminated at 
a site away from the work area shall be placed in a durable, leak proof, labeled 
or color-coded container that is closed before being removed from the work 
area. 
(C) Access to the work area shall be limited to authorized persons.Written 
policies and procedures shall be established whereby only persons who have 
been advised of the potential biohazard, who meet any specific entry 
requirements, and who comply with all entry and exit procedures shall be 
allowed to enter the work areas and animal rooms. 
(D) When other potentially infectious materials or infected animals are present 
in the work area or containment module, a hazard warning sign incorporating 
the universal biohazard symbol shall be posted on all access doors. The hazard 
warning sign shall comply with paragraph(g)(1)(ii) of this standard. 
(E) All activities involving other potentially infectious materials shall be 
conducted in biological safety cabinets or other physical-containment devices 
within the containment module. No work with these other potentially infectious 
materials shall be conducted on the open bench. 
(F) Laboratory coats, gowns, smocks, uniforms, or other appropriate protective 
clothing shall be used in the work area and animal rooms.Protective clothing 
shall not be worn outside of the work area and shall be decontaminated before 
being laundered. 
(G) Special care shall be taken to avoid skin contact with other potentially 
infectious materials. Gloves shall be worn when handling infected animals and 
when making hand contact with other potentially infectious materials is 
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unavoidable. 
(H) Before disposal all waste from work areas and from animal rooms shall 
either be incinerated or decontaminated by a method such as autoclaving known 
to effectively destroy bloodborne pathogens. 
(I) Vacuum lines shall be protected with liquid disinfectant traps and 
high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters or filters of equivalent or superior 
efficiency and which are checked routinely and maintained or replaced as 
necessary. 
(J) Hypodermic needles and syringes shall be used only for parenteral injection 
and aspiration of fluids from laboratory animals and diaphragm bottles. Only 
needle-locking syringes or disposable syringe-needle units(i.e., the needle is 
integral to the syringe) shall be used for the injection or aspiration of other 
potentially infectious materials.Extreme caution shall be used when handling 
needles and syringes. A needle shall not be bent, sheared, replaced in the sheath 
or guard, or removed from the syringe following use. The needle and syringe 
shall be promptly placed in a puncture-resistant container and autoclave or 
decontaminated before reuse or disposal. 
(K) All spills shall be immediately contained and cleaned up by appropriate 
professional staff or others properly trained and equipped to work with 
potentially concentrated infectious materials. 
(L) A spill or accident that results in an exposure incident shall be immediately 
reported to the laboratory director or other responsible person. 
(M) A biosafety manual shall be prepared or adopted and periodically 
reviewed and updated at least annually or more often if necessary.Personnel 
shall be advised of potential hazards, shall be required to read instructions on 
practices and procedures, and shall be required to follow them. 
(iii) Containment Equipment. 
(A) Certified biological safety cabinets (Class I, II, or III) or other appropriate 
combinations of personal protection or physical containment devices, such as 
special protective clothing, respirators, centrifuge safety cups, sealed centrifuge 
rotors, and containment caging for animals, shall be used for all activities with 
other potentially infectious materials that pose a threat of exposure to 
droplets,splashes, spills, or aerosols. 
(B) Biological safety cabinets shall be certified when installed,whenever they 
are moved and at least annually. 
(3) HIV and HBV research laboratories shall meet the following criteria: 
(i) Each laboratory shall contain a facility for hand washing and an eye wash 
facility which is readily available within the work area. 
(ii) An autoclave for decontamination of regulated waste shall be available. 
(4) HIV and HBV production facilities shall meet the following criteria: 
(i) The work areas shall be separated from areas that are open to unrestricted 
traffic flow within the building. Passage through two sets of doors shall be the 
basic requirement for entry into the work area from access corridors or other 
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contiguous areas. Physical separation of the high-containment work area from 
access corridors or other areas or activities may also be provided by a 
double-doored clothes-change room(showers may be included), airlock, or other 
access facility that requires passing through two sets of doors before entering the 
work area. 
(ii) The surfaces of doors, walls, floors and ceilings in the work area shall be 
water resistant so that they can be easily cleaned. Penetrations in these surfaces 
shall be sealed or capable of being sealed to facilitate decontamination. 
(iii) Each work area shall contain a sink for washing hands and a readily 
available eye wash facility. The sink shall be foot, elbow, or automatically 
operated and shall be located near the exit door of the work area. 
(iv) Access doors to the work area or containment module shall be self-closing. 
(v) An autoclave for decontamination of regulated waste shall be available 
within or as near as possible to the work area. 
(vi) A ducted exhaust-air ventilation system shall be provided. This system 
shall create directional airflow that draws air into the work area through the 
entry area. The exhaust air shall not be recirculated to any other area of the 
building, shall be discharged to the outside, and shall be dispersed away from 
occupied areas and air intakes. The proper direction of the airflow shall be 
verified (i.e., into the work area). 
(5) Training Requirements. Additional training requirements for employees in 
HIV and HBV research laboratories and HIV and HBV production facilities are 
specified in paragraph (g)(2)(ix). 
(f) Hepatitis B Vaccination and Post-exposure Evaluation and Follow-up. 
(1) General. 
(i) The employer shall make available the hepatitis B vaccine and vaccination 
series to all employees who have occupational exposure, and post-exposure 
evaluation and follow-up to all employees who have had an exposure incident. 
(ii) The employer shall ensure that all medical evaluations and procedures 
including the hepatitis B vaccine and vaccination series and post-exposure 
evaluation and follow-up, including prophylaxis, are: 
(A) Made available at no cost to the employee; 
(B) Made available to the employee at a reasonable time and place; 
(C) Performed by or under the supervision of a licensed physician or by or 
under the supervision of another licensed healthcare professional;and 
(D) Provided according to recommendations of the U.S. Public Health Service 
current at the time these evaluations and procedures take place,except as 
specified by this paragraph (f). 
(iii) The employer shall ensure that all laboratory tests are conducted by an 
accredited laboratory at no cost to the employee. 
(2) Hepatitis B Vaccination. 
(i) Hepatitis B vaccination shall be made available after the employee has 
received the training required in paragraph (g)(2)(vii)(I) and within 10 working 
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days of initial assignment to all employees who have occupational exposure 
unless the employee has previously received the complete hepatitis B vaccination 
series, antibody testing has revealed that the employee is immune, or the vaccine 
is contraindicated for medical reasons. 
(ii) The employer shall not make participation in a prescreening program a 
prerequisite for receiving hepatitis B vaccination. 
(iii) If the employee initially declines hepatitis B vaccination but at a later date 
while still covered under the standard decides to accept the vaccination, the 
employer shall make available hepatitis B vaccination at that time. 
(iv) The employer shall assure that employees who decline to accept hepatitis 
B vaccination offered by the employer sign the statement in Appendix A. 
(v) If a routine booster dose(s) of hepatitis B vaccine is recommended by the 
U.S. Public Health Service at a future date, such booster dose(s)shall be made 
available in accordance with section (f)(1)(ii). 
(3) Post-exposure Evaluation and Follow-up. Following a report of an exposure 
incident, the employer shall make immediately available to the exposed 
employee a confidential medical evaluation and follow-up,including at least the 
following elements: 
(i) Documentation of the route(s) of exposure, and the circumstances under 
which the exposure incident occurred; 
(ii) Identification and documentation of the source individual, unless the 
employer can establish that identification is infeasible or prohibited by state or 
local law; 
(A) The source individual's blood shall be tested as soon as feasible and after 
consent is obtained in order to determine HBV and HIV infectivity. If consent 
is not obtained, the employer shall establish that legally required consent cannot 
be obtained. When the source individual's consent is not required by law, the 
source individual's blood, if available, shall be tested and the results 
documented. 
(B) When the source individual is already known to be infected with HBV or 
HIV, testing for the source individual's known HBV or HIV status need not be 
repeated. 
(C) Results of the source individual's testing shall be made available to the 
exposed employee, and the employee shall be informed of applicable laws and 
regulations concerning disclosure of the identity and infectious status of the 
source individual. 
(iii) Collection and testing of blood for HBV and HIV serological status; 
(A) The exposed employee's blood shall be collected as soon as feasible and 
tested after consent is obtained. 
(B) If the employee consents to baseline blood collection, but does not give 
consent at that time for HIV serologic testing, the sample shall be preserved for 
at least 90 days. If, within 90 days of the exposure incident, the employee elects 
to have the baseline sample tested, such testing shall be done as soon as 
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feasible. 
(iv) Post-exposure prophylaxis, when medically indicated, as recommended by 
the U.S. Public Health Service; 
(v) Counseling; and 
(vi) Evaluation of reported illnesses. 
(4) Information Provided to the Healthcare Professional. 
(i) The employer shall ensure that the healthcare professional responsible for 
the employee's Hepatitis B vaccination is provided a copy of this regulation. 
(ii) The employer shall ensure that the healthcare professional evaluating an 
employee after an exposure incident is provided the following information: 
(A) A copy of this regulation; 
(B) A description of the exposed employee's duties as they relate to the 
exposure incident; 	 (C) Documentation of the route(s) of exposure and 
circumstances under which exposure occurred; 
(D) Results of the source individual's blood testing, if available; and 
(E) All medical records relevant to the appropriate treatment of the employee 
including vaccination status which are the employer's responsibility to maintain. 
(5) Healthcare Professional's Written Opinion. The employer shall obtain and 
provide the employee with a copy of the evaluating health care professional's 
written opinion within 15 days of the completion of the evaluation. 
(i) The healthcare professional's written opinion for Hepatitis B vaccination 
shall be limited to whether Hepatitis B vaccination is indicated for an employee, 
and if the employee has received such vaccination. 
(ii) The healthcare professional's written opinion for post-exposure evaluation 
and follow-up shall be limited to the following information: 
(A) That the employee has been informed of the results of the evaluation; and 
(B) That the employee has been told about any medical conditions resulting 
from exposure to blood or other potentially infectious materials which require 
further evaluation or treatment. 
(iii) All other findings or diagnoses shall remain confidential and shall not be 
included in the written report. 
(6) Medical Record keeping. Medical records required by this standard shall 
be maintained in accordance with paragraph (h)(1) of this section. 
(g) Communication of Hazards to Employees. 
(1) Labels and Signs. 
(i) Labels. 
(A) Warning labels shall be affixed to containers of regulated 
waste,refrigerators and freezers containing blood or other potentially infectious 
material; and other containers used to store, transport or ship blood or other 
potentially infectious materials, except as provided in paragraph (g)(1)(i)(E), (F) 
and (G). 
(B) Labels required by this section shall include the following legend: Place 
Symbol here BIOHAZARD 
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(C) These labels shall be fluorescent orange or orange-red or predominantly 
so, with lettering or symbols in a contrasting color. 
(D) Labels required by paragraph (g)(1)(i) shall either be an integral part of 
the container or shall be affixed as close as feasible to the container by string, 
wire, adhesive, or other method that prevents their loss or unintentional 
removal. 
(E) Red bags or red containers may be substituted for labels. 
(F) Containers of blood, blood components, or blood products that are labeled 
as to their contents and have been released for transfusion or other clinical use 
are exempted from the labeling requirements of paragraph (g). 
(G) Individual containers of blood or other potentially infectious materials that 
are placed in a labeled container during storage,transport, shipment or disposal 
are exempted from the labeling requirement. 
(H) Labels required for contaminated equipment shall be in accordance with 
this paragraph and shall also state which portions of the equipment remain 
contaminated. 
(I) Regulated waste that has been decontaminated need not be labeled or 
color-coded. (ii) Signs. 
(A) The employer shall post signs at the entrance to work areas specified in 
paragraph (e), HIV and HBV Research Laboratory and Production Facilities, 
which shall bear the following legend: biohazard symbol here BIOHAZARD 
(Name of the Infectious Agent)(Special requirements for entering the area) 
(Name, telephone number of the laboratory director or other responsible 
person.) 
(B) These signs shall be fluorescent orange-red or predominantly so,with 
lettering or symbols in a contrasting color. 
(2) Information and Training. 
(i) Employers shall ensure that all employees with occupational exposure 
participate in a training program which must be provided at no cost to the 
employee and during working hours. 
(ii) Training shall be provided as follows: 
(A) At the time of initial assignment to tasks where occupational exposure may 
take place; (B) Within 90 days after the effective date of the standard; and 
(C) At least annually thereafter. 
(iii) For employees who have received training on bloodborne pathogens in the 
year preceding the effective date of the standard, only training with respect to 
the provisions of the standard which were not included need be provided. 
(iv) Annual training for all employees shall be provided within one year of 
their previous training. 
(v) Employers shall provide additional training when changes such as 
modification of tasks or procedures or institution of new tasks or procedures 
affect the employee's occupational exposure. The additional training may be 
limited to addressing the new exposures created. 
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(vi) Material appropriate in content and vocabulary to educational level, 
literacy, and language of employees shall be used. 
(vii) The training program shall contain at a minimum the following elements: 
(A) An accessible copy of the regulatory text of this standard and an 
explanation of its contents; 
(B) A general explanation of the epidemiology and symptoms of bloodborne 
diseases; 
(C) An explanation of the modes of transmission of bloodborne pathogens; 
(D) An explanation of the employer's exposure control plan and the means by 
which the employee can obtain a copy of the written plan; 
(E) An explanation of the appropriate methods for recognizing tasks and other 
activities that may involve exposure to blood and other potentially infectious 
materials; 
(F) An explanation of the use and limitations of methods that will prevent or 
reduce exposure including appropriate engineering controls,work practices, and 
personal protective equipment; 
(G) Information on the types, proper use, location, removal, 
handling,decontamination and disposal of personal protective equipment; 
(H) An explanation of the basis for selection of personal protective equipment; 
(I) Information on the hepatitis B vaccine, including information on its 
efficacy, safety, method of administration, the benefits of being vaccinated, and 
that the vaccine and vaccination will be offered free of charge; 
(J) Information on the appropriate actions to take and persons to contact in 
an emergency involving blood or other potentially infectious materials; 
(K) An explanation of the procedure to follow if an exposure incident occurs, 
including the method of reporting the incident and the medical follow-up that 
will be made available; 
(L) Information on the post-exposure evaluation and follow-up that the 
employer is required to provide for the employee following an exposure 
incident; 
(M) An explanation of the signs and labels and/or color coding required by 
paragraph (g)(1); and 
(N) An opportunity for interactive questions and answers with the person 
conducting the training session. 
(viii) The person conducting the training shall be knowledgeable in the subject 
matter covered by the elements contained in the training program as it relates 
to the workplace that the training will address. 
(ix) Additional Initial Training for Employees in HIV and HBV Laboratories 
and Production Facilities. Employees in HIV or HBV research laboratories and 
HIV or HBV production facilities shall receive the following initial training in 
addition to the above training requirements. 
(A) The employer shall assure that employees demonstrate proficiency in 
standard microbiological practices and techniques and in the practices and 
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operations specific to the facility before being allowed to work with HIV or 
HBV. 
(B) The employer shall assure that employees have prior experience in the 
handling of human pathogens or tissue cultures before working with HIV or 
HBV. 
(C) The employer shall provide a training program to employees who have no 
prior experience in handling human pathogens. Initial work activities shall not 
include the handling of infectious agents. A progression of work activities shall 
be assigned as techniques are learned and proficiency is developed. The 
employer shall assure that employees participate in work activities involving 
infectious agents only after proficiency has been demonstrated. 
(h) Record keeping. 
(1) Medical Records. 
(i) The employer shall establish and maintain an accurate record for each 
employee with occupational exposure, in accordance with 29 CFR 1910.20. 
(ii) This record shall include: 
(A) The name and social security number of the employee; 
(B) A copy of the employee's hepatitis B vaccination status including the dates 
of all the hepatitis B vaccinations and any medical records relative to the 
employee's ability to receive vaccination as required by paragraph (f)(2); 
(C) A copy of all results of examinations, medical testing, and follow-up 
procedures as required by paragraph (f)(3); 
(D) The employer's copy of the healthcare professional's written opinion as 
required by paragraph (f)(5); and 
(E) A copy of the information provided to the healthcare professional as 
required by paragraphs (f)(4)(ii)(B)(C) and (D). 
(iii) Confidentiality. The employer shall ensure that employee medical records 
required by paragraph (h)(1) are: 
(A) Kept confidential; and 
(B) Are not disclosed or reported without the employee's express written 
consent to any person within or outside the workplace except as required by this 
section or as may be required by law. 
(iv) The employer shall maintain the records required by paragraph (h)for at 
least the duration of employment plus 30 years in accordance with29 CFR 
1910.20. 
(2) Training Records. 
(i) Training records shall include the following information: 
(A) The dates of the training sessions; 
(B) The contents or a summary of the training sessions; 
(C) The names and qualifications of persons conducting the training;and 
(D) The names and job titles of all persons attending the training sessions. 
(ii) Training records shall be maintained for 3 years from the date on which 
the training occurred. 
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(3) Availability. 
(i) The employer shall ensure that all records required to be maintained by 
this section shall be made available upon request to the Assistant Secretary and 
the Director for examination and copying. 
(ii) Employee training records required by this paragraph shall be provided 
upon request for examination and copying to employees, to employee 
representatives, to the Director, and to the Assistant Secretary in accordance 
with 29 CFR 1910.20. 
(iii) Employee medical records required by this paragraph shall be provided 
upon request for examination and copying to the subject employee, to anyone 
having written consent of the subject employee, to the Director, and to the 
Assistant Secretary in accordance with 29 CFR1910.20. 
(4) Transfer of Records. 
(i) The employer shall comply with the requirements involving transfer of 
records set forth in 29 CFR1910.20(h). 
(ii) If the employer ceases to do business and there is no successor employer 
to receive and retain the records for the prescribed period, the employer shall 
notify the Director, at least three months prior to their disposal and transmit 
them to the Director, if required by the Director to do so, within that three 
month period. 
(i) Dates. 
(1) Effective Date. The standard shall become effective on March 6,1992. 
(2) The Exposure Control Plan required by paragraph (c)(2) of this section 
shall be completed on or before May 5, 1992. 
(3) Paragraph (g)(2) Information and Training and (h) Record keeping shall 
take effect on or before June 4, 1992. 
(4) Paragraphs (d)(2) Engineering and Work Practice Controls, (d)(3)Personal 
Protective Equipment, (d)(4) Housekeeping, (e) HIV and HBV Research 
Laboratories and Production Facilities, (f) Hepatitis B Vaccination and 
Post-Exposure Evaluation and Follow-up, and 	 (g)(1)Labels and Signs, shall 
take effect July 6, 1992.* [Effective date for this standard 1910.1030, is March 
6, 1992] 
Part Number 	 1910 Standard Number 1910.1030 App A Title Appendix 
A - Hepatitis B Vaccine Declination (Mandatory) * [Effective date for this 
standard, 1910.1030, is March 6, 1992] 	 I understand that due to my 
occupational exposure to blood or other potentially infectious materials I may 
be at risk of acquiring hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection. I have been given the 
opportunity to be vaccinated with hepatitis B vaccine, at no charge to myself. 
However, I decline hepatitis B vaccination at this time. I understand that by 
declining this vaccine, I continue to be at risk of acquiring hepatitis B, a serious 
disease. If in the future I continue to have occupational exposure to blood or 
other potentially infectious materials and I want to be vaccinated with hepatitis 
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B vaccine, I can receive the vaccination series at no charge to me.* (Approved 
by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 1218-0180)* 
[56 FR 64004, Dec. 06, 1991; 57 FR April 13, 1992] 
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GLOSSARY 
ACET - Advisory Committee for Elimination of Tuberculosis 
AFB - Acid Fast Bacilli 
ASHRAE - American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning 
Engineers 
ATP - Adenosine Triphosphate 
CDC - Center for Disease Control 
ED - Emergency Department 
EMB - Ethionamide 
EMS - Emergency Medical Service 
HBV - Hepatitis B Virus 
HEPA - High Efficiency Particulate Airfilter 
HIV - Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
INH - Isoniazid 
MRTB - Multidrug Resistant Tuberculosis 
NIOSH - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
PAPR - Powered Air-purified Respirator 
PAS - Para-Aminosalicylic Acid 
PEL - Permissible Exposure Limit 
PPD - Purified Protein Derivative 
PPE - Personal Protective Equipment 
134 
PR - Personal Respirator 
PZA - Pyrazinamide 
QLFT - Qualitative Fit Testing 
QNFT - Quantitative Fit Testing 
RIF - Rifampin 
SM - Streptomycin 
TB - Tuberculosis 
TLV - Threshold Limit Value 
TU - Tuberculin Units 
UV - Ultra Violet 
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